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“On the Eve of Destruction”: Courts Confronting the
Climate Emergency*
MARY CHRISTINA WOOD†
In the dim and smokey twilight, with only bare necessities in tow, a family rushes to
escape the wildfire racing toward them. Elsewhere, a household evacuates just
ahead of a category five hurricane, perhaps not for the first time. Along the
coastlines, countless others are resigned to looking on as their homesites erode into
the inexorably rising surf. At this moment, millions of Americans are forced to reckon
with the horrors of the climate catastrophe, and the number of such people who now
viscerally grasp our grim climate reality grows every day. Even the judges of this
nation prove no exception to this trend. Enveloped by smoke from a recent wildfire,
a Washington appellate court judge remarked to a government attorney in an
atmospheric trust litigation case: “I can’t go outside. If I go outside, I’m threatening
my life. I have asthma, so I have to stay inside with the windows shut—I don’t have
an air conditioner. Why isn’t that affecting my life and my liberty?” Amidst a fullblown climate emergency in which the fate of Humanity rests, this Article argues that
our judiciary system is equipped—and is Constitutionally duty-bound—to provide
the people of our nation a remedy for the extraordinary governmental malfeasance
that has brought our nation, and indeed the world, this climate calamity.1

* This Article developed from a keynote address delivered for the Indiana University
Maurer School of Law as the 2020 Ralph F. Fuchs Lecture. The Article is not intended to be
exhaustive but rather builds on broad propositions developed in other works by the author.
Footnotes often refer to larger bodies of work containing citations. This was a project of the
University of Oregon Environmental and Natural Resources Law Center’s Conservation Trust
Project (CTP). A sequel project is underway to inventory and explore the judicial tools used
by courts worldwide in Atmospheric Trust Litigation (ATL) climate cases. Enormous thanks
to Michael O’Neil, CTP fellow, for excellent research contributing to this Article, to Anne
Wolke, CTP fellow, for research on the international cases, to Charles Lockwood, CTP fellow,
and Brenden Catt, Oceans, Coasts, and Watersheds Project fellow, for finalizing footnotes,
and to the dedicated editorial staff of the Indiana Law Journal for superb editing and citation
assistance. Appreciation goes to my colleague, Tom Lininger, who shared his expertise on an
important aspect of this Article, and to Laurie Jordan, Policy Analyst for the Columbia River
Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, for help with documents in U.S. v. Oregon; any errors in
interpretation are mine. I dedicate this Article to the memory of Killian Doherty, UO Law
(‘14), a brilliant scholar of environmental justice and indigenous communities who shaped
climate law around the globe through his work at the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide.
His ability to communicate across cultures, unwavering commitment to environmental justice,
and passion for life lives on through the people he touched and the fundamental environmental
rights he helped vindicate.
† Philip H. Knight Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Environmental and Natural
Resources Law Center, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. Opening remarks at the Fuchs Lecture, University of Indiana (Oct. 30, 2020),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaHUQ5e1SBw (quoting from the Oral
Argument at 16:28, Aji P. by & through Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021)
(No. 80007-8), https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2020091079
&autoStartStream=true [https://perma.cc/4SLR-FLSW]).
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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the role of the courts in our climate emergency. It begins by
appraising our climate reality and then illuminating the governmental malfeasance
that delivered our nation this existential threat. It will suggest that the climate crisis
worsened to the point of all-out emergency due to an imbalance of power between
the three branches of government and a colossal failure of constitutional checks and
balances. Essentially unbridled discretion grew in the executive branch, which used
environmental laws to advantage fossil fuel corporations even as the mounting peril
of their products was patently clear. Over the course of several presidential
administrations, a dispassionate and ineffective judiciary failed to protect the country
from a mounting ecological tyranny wielded by environmental agencies—to the
point that little restraint existed when the Trump administration floored the
accelerator on fossil fuel development, speeding the nation, and the entire world,
toward the climate cliff.2 The World Meteorological Organization has predicted that

2. See Expert Report of James E. Hansen, Ph.D. 7, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.
3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 6:15-cv01517-TC) (“The present Defendants under the Trump Administration—building upon the
actions of prior administrations in allowing, permitting, and subsidizing fossil fuel interests to
exploit our reserves and treat the atmosphere as a dumping ground for waste carbon dioxide
(CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs)—has floored the emissions accelerator and thus
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the earth will blow past the key temperature target of 1.5 degrees Celsius in the next
five years.3
Against such climate reality, this Article then examines the leading American
climate case, Juliana v. United States.4 The lawsuit was brought in 2015 against the
Obama administration on behalf of twenty-one youth plaintiffs who challenged the
entire American fossil fuel system.5 The young plaintiffs sought a declaration that
their government, by controlling the fossil fuel energy system responsible for
destroying the climate system upon which all life, liberty, and property depends, was
violating their fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
and the venerable public trust principle. They further sought injunctive relief
ordering government defendants to develop a remedial plan to decarbonize the
energy system and take actions to restore the climate system according to
scientifically developed standards—before society passes points of no return that will
trigger uncontrollable, runaway heating that is not survivable. The ambition of these
twenty-one plaintiffs, combined with the rank urgency of stopping climate
destabilization, evoked a characterization of this lawsuit as “the biggest case on the
planet.”6

hurdles Plaintiffs, their progeny, and the natural world as we have come to know it, towards
climate points of no return.”); see also Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1176 (9th Cir.
2020) (Staton, J., dissenting) (describing the climate emergency).
3. Press Release, World Meteorological Org., New Climate Predictions Increase
Likelihood of Temporarily Reaching 1.5°C in Next 5 Years (May 27, 2021),
https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/new-climate-predictions-increase-likelihoodof-temporarily-reaching-15-°c-next-5 [https://perma.cc/7SZ7-EVFC]. A draft report by the
UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released to the press in June 2021
underscores the gravity of the climate crisis. See Marlow Hood, Crushing Climate Impacts to
Hit Sooner than Feared: Draft UN Report, PhYSORG (June 23, 2021),
https://phys.org/news/2021-06-climate-impacts
-sooner.html [https://perma.cc/QFL2-J2YC] (summarizing the report as concluding that
“dangerous thresholds are closer than once thought, and dire consequences stemming from
decades of unbridled carbon pollution are unavoidable in the short term,” and “[s]pecies
extinction, more widespread disease, unliveable heat, ecosystem collapse, cities menaced by
rising seas—these and other devastating climate impacts are accelerating and bound to become
painfully obvious before a child born today turns 30.”).
4. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). For a detailed analysis of the case, see Michael C.
Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and
the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2017).
5. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1165.
6. Laura Parker, ‘Biggest Case on the Planet’ Pits Kids v. Climate Change, NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/kids-sue
-us-government-climate-change [https://perma.cc/YH4F-KTGE]; John D. Sutter, Meet the
Mom Litigating the ‘Biggest Case on the Planet’, CNN (Sept. 16, 2013),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/12/opinions/sutter
-julia-olson-climate-kids-profile/index.html [https://perma.cc/2QQQ-DGJJ]; see also Chelsea
Harvey, Trump Could Face the ‘Biggest Trial of the Century’–Over Climate Change, WASH.
POST
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/12/01/trump-could
-face-the-biggest-trial-of-the-century-over-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/SKE4-FA9U].
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The plaintiffs secured a decisive and sweeping victory in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Oregon, which announced for the first time ever a constitutionally
grounded right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”7 But this
remarkable case did not proceed to trial. Instead, it was taken by the Ninth Circuit on
an interlocutory appeal and dismissed by a bitterly divided appellate panel of three
judges. The majority and dissenting opinions articulate two profoundly different
judicial roles—paradigms explored in this Article. The majority opinion dismissing
the case, penned by Judge Andrew Hurwitz and joined by Judge Mary Murguia,
suggests that the judiciary has no conceivable role in addressing the climate crisis
and that the matter must be left to the two political branches—the very branches that
delivered this emergency to the American public in the first place. The opinion
solidifies the imbalance of power by casting courts in what this Article calls a
“passive umpire” role. This role typifies the court’s function in simpler cases brought
under narrow environmental statutes—cases that end in clear wins or losses and, in
the case of victories for plaintiffs, usually result in straightforward remands to the
agency. Such rulings characteristically terminate judicial involvement altogether.
The dissent by Judge Staton positions the court to squarely confront the reality of
the climate emergency and avail itself of a last chance at forcing government to slam
the brakes on the fossil fuel system before our agencies push the nation (and indeed
the world) over the climate precipice. Judge Staton’s vision of judicial involvement
falls directly in line with that of other civil rights cases dealing with constitutional
rights violations: desegregation, treaty rights, and prisoners’ rights cases. In these
cases, government’s violations reflect longstanding, baked-in, institutional disregard
for constitutional protections, and the remedy is not a simple remand. Instead, the
court serves what this Article calls an “engagement role” in which the judge uses
problem-solving tools as well as skilled mediation techniques to arrive at broad
declaratory relief and remedial plans designed to correct the dysfunction that caused
the agency to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. These cases may entail
extended judicial involvement, sometimes lasting over many decades, to correct the
course of the defendants’ institutional malfeasance and establish safeguards to ensure
the agencies will not slip into recidivism. To Judge Staton, this judicial role,
requested by the plaintiffs, was reasonable and feasible, grounded in ample
precedent, with tools readily applicable to the climate crisis despite its unprecedented
and daunting complexity.8 As this Article later explains, the clear momentum of
international cases is in line with Judge Staton’s view, as more and more courts are
holding their governments accountable for climate action.
After an unsuccessful petition for en banc review before the Ninth Circuit, the
groundbreaking Juliana case is back in the Oregon district court where plaintiffs
have tried to engage in settlement discussions with the Biden administration and also
await a decision on a motion to amend their complaint to adjust the remedy they seek.
The Article ends by suggesting the climate-specific parameters of a judicial role in
this next phase of the Juliana litigation and, more broadly, in cases around the globe.

7. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
8. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175–90 (Staton, J., dissenting).
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I. ALIGNING A LEGAL APPROACH WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE AND THE
FOUNDATIONAL PUBLIC TRUST
The climate crisis puts human life in grave peril. Laws that fail to fully confront
this reality will prove to be irrelevant, abstract, and ineffectual. As Oren Lyons,
educator and faithkeeper of the Onondaga Nation, puts it: “The thing that you have
to understand about nature and natural law is, there’s no mercy . . . . There’s only
Law.”9 In other words, Nature, not Congress, wields the supreme laws by which we
must abide.10 Our edifice of environmental law, immense as it is and operative for
over half a century, has come altogether unhinged from the arrangement that Nature
established to keep our climate system in balance. For decades, the U.S. government
has commandeered statutory law to actually repudiate those supreme laws of Nature
by invoking permit systems to legalize colossal landscape damage and unfathomable
amounts of pollution—contaminating the waters, poisoning the soils, and flooding
the atmosphere with greenhouse gas emissions. Journalist Elizabeth Kolbert sums it
up: “It may seem impossible to imagine that a technologically advanced society
could choose, in essence, to destroy itself, but that is what we’re now in the process
of doing.”11
Any discussion of government’s role in climate crisis must be framed by the
deepest obligations of sovereignty itself as tied to those laws of Nature. While many
foundational rights exist in specific form in constitutions designed to organize
democracies, the ecological rights of all sovereigns toward their citizens reside most
anciently in the public trust principle, a primordial doctrine with roots tracing to the
Roman Institutes of Justinian.12 This principle animates legal systems throughout the
world.13 It characterizes vital natural resources as a “trust,” a lasting ecological
endowment meant to sustain society into perpetuity. The ecological wealth
comprises the “res” of the trust and is owned in common by the citizens as present
and future beneficiaries. Government is the trustee of this invaluable commonwealth
and must manage it strictly for the benefit of its citizens. As many courts have held,
the trust principle prohibits government (with narrow exceptions) from allowing

9. Tim Knauss, Onondaga Faithkeeper Oren Lyons Speaks Out on the Environment:
‘Business as Usual is Over’, SYRACUSE.COM (Mar. 23, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www
.syracuse.com/progress/2008/02/onondaga_faithkeeper_oren_lyon.html
[https://perma.cc/7TMU-7HYW].
10. Throughout this Article, the words “Nature” and “Humanity” are capitalized to reflect
the universal instrumentality of each as bearing on the climate crisis.
11. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man–III, THE NEW YORKER (May 1, 2005),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/05/09/the-climate-of-man-iii
[https://perma.cc/U223-LB2E].
12. See JUSTINIAN I, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 603–30 (Thomas C. Sandars trans.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 5th ed. 1876) (533 AD). The principles set forth in this section are
explained in detail in MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR
A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 143–229 (2013) [hereinafter WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST]. This Article
summarizes and does not repeat that discussion.
13. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW Ch. 11 (3d ed. 2021) (surveying
international decisions).
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“substantial impairment” of the trust.14 Because the trust principle conceives of
rivers, wildlife, streambeds, and the atmosphere itself as discernable components of
the “res,”15 it requires legal systems to align environmental mandates with the laws
of Nature.
The public trust principle’s macro approach, geared to the holistic requirements
of sustaining a resource in its totality, differs greatly from the compartmentalized,
fractured procedural requirements of environmental statutes that come to bear in
myopic fashion on singular actions.16 The Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
Endangered Species Act, and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for
example, will be triggered by individual harmful actions—such as a proposed oil
lease, a proposed industrial plant, or a proposed discharge of pollution—and their
legal force scopes only to those discrete actions, shutting out the big picture of
resource health. By contrast, the public trust scrutinizes the trustee’s overall
management of the natural asset—the river, wetland, species, or atmosphere—and
stays unyielding on this point: government has a fiduciary obligation to sustain this
endowment to support a flourishing society into the future.17 In this framework,
survival resources remain quintessential public property belonging to posterity, and
government’s clear responsibility is to manage such ecological wealth strictly for the
endurance of society itself, for the benefit of both present and future citizens—not
for the advantage of private parties or profiteers who may seek to despoil the trust
and appropriate it for their own purposes.18
Grounded in the logic of survival and inter-generational justice, the principle has
been operational in the United States since the nation’s beginning and continues to
influence cases worldwide (though many courts in other nations simply express the
principle as a duty to future generations).19 Many judges, scholars, and lawyers find
that the doctrine has constitutional underpinnings as an attribute of sovereignty
itself.20 Professor Gerald Torres and Nathan Bellinger describe the trust as a slate
“on which the Constitution was written,”21 embracing “inherent rights that pre-date[]
the United States Constitution.”22 At its core, the principle remains essentialist and
democratic, securing “inherent and indefeasible” public property rights23 originally

14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at Chs. 3–9.
16. For discussion, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at 54–57, 143–44.
17. For discussion, see id. at 167–75.
18. For discussion, see id. at 179–81.
19. See BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 13, at 449.
20. See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d &
remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Public trust claims are unique because they
concern inherent attributes of sovereignty.”). See also WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note
12, at Ch. 6.
21. Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE
FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 281, 288 (2014).
22. Id.
23. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 947–48 (Pa. 2013) (further
describing such rights as “of such ‘general, great and essential’ quality as to be ensconced as
‘inviolate’”); see also Order Affirming the Department of Ecology’s Denial of Petition for
Rule Making, Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct.
Nov. 19, 2015); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d &
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reserved through the people’s social contract with the sovereign government. Public
trust rights thus function as a restraint exercised by citizens against their government.
In the United States, these rights are fundamentally American, as they originate
in the sovereign compact, but they are less familiar than rights focused on the
individual—such as the freedom of religion or equal protection. Public trust rights
materialize as collectively-held property rights. As the U.S. Supreme Court decided
in the landmark public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,24 a
state legislature could not convey away to a private railroad corporation the lakebed
of Lake Michigan in which “the whole people are interested.”25 Justice Field
proclaimed, “The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the
principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a
direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their
common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free
people.”26
By enforcing a trust over crucial resources, courts prevent any present set of
legislators from wielding so much power over ecology as to cripple future
legislatures in meeting their citizens’ needs. Moreover, courts make clear that the
legislature cannot abdicate the trust because it remains an “attribute of sovereignty,”
a constitutive principle that government cannot shed. As a federal district court
explained: “The trust is of such a nature that it can be held only by the sovereign, and
can only be destroyed by the destruction of the sovereign.”27 Holding constitutional
force, the principle is perpetually binding on legislatures and agencies.28
The public trust doctrine can only serve its fundamental purpose if enforced by
the courts.29 In this way, the public trust falls in step with a recursive theme
throughout history: courts embody a unique role in our constitutional democracy,
assigned the duty to enforce the fundamental and inherent rights of citizens against
their own government. If the Illinois Central case was the manifestation of this
constitutional role in 1892, the Juliana case is the manifestation of this same role
today, though the stakes are exponentially greater than in earlier times, likely greater
than the Illinois Central Justices could possibly have imagined. Never in America’s
history has the underlying prospect of political environmental tyranny in our
democratic system been brought to the fore so dramatically in the form of a court
proceeding. While Justice Field said it “would not be listened to” that the great

remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). For commentary on the inalienable right to a stable
climate system, see Tom Coffin, Guest Post: A Sustainable Climate is a Basic Human Right,
THE REAL BIOCENE (Nov. 22, 2021), https://the-real-biocene.net/f/a-sustainable-climate-is-abasic-human-right [https://perma.cc/K399-JB97].
24. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
25. Id. at 453.
26. Id. at 456 (quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821)).
27. United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981).
28. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at Chapter 6.
29. See Stix v. Comm’r, 152 F.2d 562, 563 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (noting, in the context of Indian trust doctrine, that a
“fundamental incident” of the trust relationship is “the right of an injured beneficiary to sue
the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust”).
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shoreline of Lake Michigan could fall into private hands,30 the question today is
whether it will “be listened to”—and indeed judicially affirmed—that the climate
system sustaining all life on Earth will collapse, largely at our government’s own
doing31 in its ambition to deliver short-term advantages to the fossil fuel industry.
II. THE CLIMATE IMPERATIVE
Justice Holmes wrote that the common law embodies “the felt necessities of the
time.”32 To evaluate any legal approach to the climate emergency, we must first
determine what Nature requires to maintain society’s stability and to perpetuate the
ecological endowment for present and future generations. In this regard, leading
scientists emphasize the need to bring atmospheric carbon dioxide back down to 350
parts per million—the highest level at which the planet and its inhabitants can remain
generally safe.33 Present levels soar above that, at 418 parts per million, as fossil fuel
emissions continue to spew carbon dioxide and methane gas into our atmosphere.34
It is projected that the current “business as usual” trajectory will lock in a temperature
rise of eleven degrees Fahrenheit over pre-industrial temperatures by the end of the
century, and possibly much earlier.35 Such heating is not broadly survivable.36
Children born today will face a world in cataclysmic collapse if Humanity fails to
rapidly change course.37 Indeed, courts across the world are now grasping the

30. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455.
31. See Complaint at 1, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or.
2016), rev’d & remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC) (compiling
evidence of U.S. government’s affirmative fossil fuel policy over decades); id. at 7 (“[T]he
United States is responsible for 25.5% of global historic cumulative CO2 emissions.”). See
also Tim Dickerson, U.S. Becomes Net Oil Exporter as World Burns, ROLLING STONE (June
7, 2021), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/u-s-becomes-net-oil-exporteras-world-burns-1179815/ [https://perma.cc/JET4-YAY4] (describing “America’s emergence
as a petroleum superpower”).
32. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harv. Univ. Press 2009)
(1881).
33. See infra note 248 and accompanying text; James Hansen et al., Assessing
“Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young
People, Future Generations and Nature, 8 PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2013).
34. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,
GLOB. MONITORING LAB’Y (Aug. 5, 2021), https://gml.noaa.gov/ccgg/trends/
[https://perma.cc/MSF4-X3RS].
35. Steven C. Sherwood & Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate Change
Due to Heat Stress, 107 PNAS 9552, 9552 (2010).
36. See DAVID WALLACE-WELLS, THE UNINHABITABLE EARTH: LIFE AFTER WARMING
(2019); Andrew Freedman & Jason Samenow, Humidity and Heat Extremes Are on the Verge
of Exceeding Limits of Human Survivability, Study Finds, WASHINGTON POST (May 8, 2020)
(reporting study warning that highly populated regions of the world will be rendered
uninhabitable sooner than previously thought for parts of the year); Nafeez Ahmed, New
Report Suggests ‘High Likelihood of Human Civilization Coming to an End’ Starting in 2050,
VICE (June 3, 2019).
37. See Sherwood & Huber, supra note 35. As a climate scientist put it recently, “[I]t is
impossible to just engineer our way out of this . . . .” Oliver Milman, Global Heating Pace
Risks ‘Unstoppable’ Sea Level Rise as Antarctic Ice Sheet Melts, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2021,
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severity of our climate emergency.38 As an Australian court recently declared in a
case challenging an approved coal mine:
It is difficult to characterise in a single phrase the devastation that the
plausible evidence presented in this proceeding forecasts for the
Children. As Australian adults know their country, Australia will be lost
and the World as we know it gone as well . . . [This] will largely be
inflicted by the inaction of this generation of adults, in what might fairly
be described as the greatest inter-generational injustice ever inflicted by
one generation of humans upon the next.39
Climate tipping points40 infuse this situation with an urgency never before
confronted by the law. Society faces the very real and imminent prospect of
uncontrollable, runaway heating if it pushes global temperatures beyond a point of
no return: Nature’s own positive feedback loops would drive up the heating more
and render it impossible to return to safety (barring risky, untried, very expensive,
and potentially disastrous geoengineering solutions).41 One such tipping point lurks
in the permafrost, covering the northern latitudes, containing a colossal amount of
carbon dioxide and methane.42 When permafrost melts, it releases those greenhouse
gases into the atmosphere.43 Vast tracts of permafrost have already begun to melt,
and scientists warn that we are on the verge of “massive” permafrost collapse.44 In
late 2019, the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, explained: “The
point of no-return is no longer over the horizon. It is in sight and hurtling towards

9:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/may/05/antarctica-ice-sheetmelting-global-heating-sea-level-rise-study [https://perma.cc/3YLJ-N4T4].
38. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020); see also infra Part
XV.
39. Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v. Minister for the Env’t [2021] FCA 560 (27 May 2021)
(Austl.) (emphasis added).
40. See generally FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS FEAR
TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE, at xxiv–vi (2007) (describing “unstoppable planetary
forces” beyond tipping points and the end of climatic stability). A recent draft report released
by U.N. scientists underscored the danger of such tipping points. See Hood, supra note 3
(summarizing report: “the report outlines the danger of compound and cascading impacts,
along with point-of-no-return thresholds in the climate system known as tipping points, which
scientists have barely begun to measure and understand. . . . A dozen temperature trip wires
have now been identified in the climate system for irreversible and potentially catastrophic
change.”).
41. See Hood, supra note 3; Nafeez Ahmed, James Hansen: Fossil Fuel Addiction Could
Trigger Runaway Global Warming, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2013, 6:44 AM), https://www
.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/jul/10/james-hansen-fossil-fuels-runaway
-global-warming [https://perma.cc/87GF-B8EN].
42. Fred Pearce, As Climate Change Worsens, a Cascade of Tipping Points Looms, YALE
ENV’T 360 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-climate-changes-worsens-a
-cascade-of-tipping-points-looms [https://perma.cc/E8JZ-G3MX].
43. Id.
44. Chelsea Harvey, If Past Is a Guide, Arctic Could Be Verging on Permafrost Collapse,
SCI. AM. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/if-past-is-a-guide-arctic
-could-be-verging-on-permafrost-collapse/ [https://perma.cc/3J3K-4JHU].
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us.”45 More recently, he pronounced: “[T]he state of the planet is broken . . .
Humanity is waging war on nature. This is suicidal.”46
Three touchstones define the massive decarbonization effort necessary to avoid
these tipping points. First, looking back, global society had to start bending down the
curve of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.47 By all logical measure, at the end of
2019, President Trump’s frenzied and reckless promotion of fossil fuels seemed to
make that key requirement unattainable.48 But the COVID-19 pandemic that disabled
the world caused a wholly unexpected, abrupt eight percent drop of carbon dioxide
emissions, perhaps keeping open a slim window of opportunity to stave off tipping
points.49 The remaining requirements announced by U.N. scientists are to curtail
emissions by forty-five percent by 2030, and to achieve full decarbonization by
2050.50 Feasible as these may appear on paper, these numbers will ruthlessly probe
the depths of Humanity’s collective resolve in the decades to come. The International
Energy Agency forecasts that, in 2023, a COVID economic rebound will produce the
largest annual output of carbon dioxide emissions in human history.51

45. António Guterres, Secretary-General, U.N., Opening Remarks at Pre-COP25 Press
Conference (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-12-01
/remarks-pre-cop25-press-conference [https://perma.cc/2VU7-32U9].
46. António Guterres, Secretary-General, U.N., Address at Columbia University: The
State of the Planet (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-12-02
/address-columbia-university-the-state-of-the-planet [https://perma.cc/HG5J-CQ2S].
47. Edith M. Lederer, UN Chief: World Must Prevent Runaway Climate Change by 2020,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/floods-united-nations
-antonio-guterres-us-news-climate-71ab1abf44c14605bf2dda29d6b5ebcc
[https://perma.cc/84E6-D24C].
48. Ashley Parker & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan: More Fossil Fuels
and Fewer Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27
/us/politics/donald-trump-global-warming-energy-policy.html
[https://perma.cc/8XFRNU8V].
49. Josh Gabbatiss, IEA: Coronavirus Impact on CO2 Emissions Six Times Larger Than
2008 Financial Crisis, CARBONBRIEF (Apr. 30, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org
/iea-coronavirus-impact-on-co2-emissions-six-times-larger-than-financial-crisis
[https://perma.cc/2SMS-L69Q].
50. António Guterres, Secretary-General, U.N., Remarks to 25th Conference of Parties to
the United Nations Climate Change Convention (Dec. 2, 2019), https://unfccc.int/sites
/default/files/resource/UN%20Secretary-General%27s%20remarks%20at%20opening
%20ceremony%20of%20UN%20Climate%20Change%20Conference%20COP25.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LG5-F6KD].
51. Fiona Harvey, Emissions Will Hit Record High by 2023 if Green Recovery Fails, Says
IEA, THE GUARDIAN (July 20, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021
/jul/20/emissions-record-high-by-2023-if-green-recovery-fails-says-iea
[https://perma.cc/W4F4-UR82]. On September 17, 2021, the U.N. warned that the aggregate
climate pledges of the world’s nations would increase global greenhouse gas emissions by
16% rather than slash them by 45% as U.N. scientists have warned is necessary. William Booth
& Tyler Pager, As Climate Pledges Fall Short, U.N. Predicts Globe Could Warm by
Catastrophic 2.7 Degrees Celsius, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/09/17/un-climate-2030-biden/
[https://perma.cc/QZ6H-YZTN].
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Emerging from these climate imperatives is an inescapable reckoning: there is no
way to continue wholesale reliance on fossil fuels, even for a few more years, and
still remain on the safe side of those tipping points.52 In spite of this long-known
reality, the U.S. government has deliberately organized this nation’s energy system
around oil, coal, and natural gas.53 Moreover, it has supplied the world with these
dangerous fossil fuels.54 The Ninth Circuit Juliana panel acknowledged that “the
federal government has long promoted fossil fuel use despite knowing that it can
cause catastrophic climate change” and that (at the time the case was decided in
2019) “the country is now expanding oil and gas extraction four times faster than any
other nation.”55
Ninth Circuit Judge Andrew Hurwitz strung together a stepwise outline of our
present situation, even as he dismissed the youths’ case: (1) “since the dawn of the
Industrial Age, atmospheric carbon dioxide has skyrocketed to levels not seen for
almost three million years”; (2) “[t]his unprecedented rise stem[ming] from fossil
fuel combustion will wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked”; (3) “climate
change is affecting [plaintiffs] now in concrete ways and will continue to do so unless
checked”; (4) “this growth [of emissions] shows no signs of abating”; and (5) this
trend “may hasten an environmental collapse.”56
The haunting prospect of such encompassing, irreparable harm sets this case apart
from any other precedent in terms of the human interests at stake and the expediency
with which court rulings must issue in a time of urgency. Because no crisis is as
ominous, imminent, and far reaching, the climate emergency must be considered sui
generis, which is a Latin term meaning “in a class of its own,” or “unique.” The legal
approach must rise to the emergency rather than repeat a failed past paradigm.
III. “GOODBYE NEW YORK. GOODBYE WASHINGTON”: WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT
KNEW
As fully recognized by the Juliana majority, the American government is not a
passive bystander to the climate crisis: it controls and fervently promotes the fossil
fuel energy system through subsidies, tax exemptions, permits for fossil fuel
development projects at home and abroad, leases on federal lands and offshore areas,
permits for imports and exports, and permits for energy facilities.57 For extensive

52. Sarah Schonhardt, Foss Fuel Development to Exceed Global Climate Targets,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fossil-fueldevelopment-to-exceed-global-climate-targets/# [https://perma.cc/EK9E-MLD4]
(summarizing 2021 report by U.N. Environment Programme and other research organizations)
(“[C]oal production would need to decline each year by 11 percent on average by 2030 to limit
warming to 1.5 C. Oil and gas would need to fall by 4 and 3 percent, respectively, over that
period.”).
53. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Fossil Fuels Account for the Largest Share of U.S.
Energy Production and Consumption, TODAY IN ENERGY (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45096 [https://perma.cc/2AR7-Q4RL].
54. See Dickerson, supra note 31.
55. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1167 (“The government affirmatively promotes fossil fuel use in a host of ways,
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evidence of government’s longstanding awareness that sustained reliance on fossil
fuels would unleash calamity on its own citizens, the Juliana docket provides ample
reading material.58 Compiling voluminous documents spanning the past half century
over several administrations—Democrat and Republican alike—the Juliana
plaintiffs alleged in their fifty-two-page complaint that the government has
demonstrated “deliberate indifference to the peril they knowingly created.”59 The
accusation finds dramatic example in a letter by a top aide to President Nixon’s
domestic policy adviser, underscoring the potential impact of rising sea levels in
1969, stating: “Goodbye New York. Goodbye Washington, for that matter.”60 In
1986, a Senate subcommittee observed that “there is a very real possibility that
man—through ignorance or indifference, or both—is irreversibly altering the ability
of our atmosphere to perform basic life support functions for the planet.”61 A
particularly vivid description of the situation was provided to the press in 2009 by
Steven Chu, secretary of energy under President Obama: “I don’t think the American
public has gripped in its gut what could happen . . . . We’re looking at a scenario
where there’s no more agriculture in California . . . . I don’t actually see how they
can keep their cities going either.”62 Instead of steadily transitioning the full energy
infrastructure from a dangerous dependence upon fossil fuels to alternative
renewable sources, the American government squandered decades while the window
of opportunity to restore the climate system inexorably closed.
Even as the universal peril of climate disruption was triggering widespread global
alarm, President Trump came into office in 2016 on a platform of developing fifty
trillion dollars’ worth of domestic fossil fuels—and pursued that goal with vengeance
against the American children and future generations sentenced to suffer unspeakable
harm as their lives unfold.63 As a sitting president with control over the world’s
largest energy system just as the window of opportunity to stave off tipping points
was closing, Trump held unfathomable power over the fate of our planet.

including beneficial tax provisions, permits for imports and exports, subsidies for domestic
and overseas projects, and leases for fuel extraction on federal land.”).
58. As Judge Hurwitz observed, “The record also conclusively establishes that the federal
government has long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide
emissions.” Id. at 1166. For a devastating expose¢ of the federal government’s role, see JAMES
GUSTAVE SPETH, THEY KNEW: THE US GOVERNMENT’S 50-YEAR ROLE IN CAUSING THE
CLIMATE CRISIS (2021).
59. Complaint, supra note 31, at 8.
60. Memorandum from Daniel P. Moynihan, Assistant to the President for Domestic
Pol’y, to John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affs. (Sept. 17, 1969),
https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/56.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G92P-AKLJ].
61. Ozone Depletion, the Greenhouse Effect, and Climate Change: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Env’t Pollution of the Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 99th Cong. 2 (1986)
(opening statement of Sen. John H. Chafee, Chairman, Subcomm. on Env’t Pollution).
62. Jim Tankersley, Climate Change Imperils Farming, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2009, 12:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-feb-04-me-warming4-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8V27-U2WQ].
63. Annie Sneed, Trump’s First 100 Days: Climate and Energy, SCI. AM. (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumps-first-100-days-climate-and-energy/
[https://perma.cc/UND3-GX7W].
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The nation has since witnessed a substantial changing of the guard, as President
Biden pledges actions aimed at halting oil, coal, and gas development on federal
public lands.64 But President Biden’s administration has also made decisions
regarding leasing and stances in lawsuits that could lock in drilling and burning of
fossil fuels for decades.65 Moreover, despite his announced climate agenda, President
Biden only oversees the executive branch. Congress, though presently controlled by
democrats, may not sufficiently fund the Biden climate agenda.66 Finally, executive
actions are not “durable” laws, because they remain vulnerable to reversal by the
next administration. Four years of even the most climate-protective action remain a
fleeting period when juxtaposed with the likely century-long project required to
restore an atmospheric CO2 balance safe for human habitation; the glaring proximity
of tipping points for the foreseeable future magnifies the chance of fatal error. Only
a rigorous and durable institutional apparatus—not simply a rerun of past governance
approaches and frameworks—bears hope of achieving long-term recovery of the
climate system. This Article argues that a judicial remedy remains necessary to
provide the stability and accountability needed to sustain a protracted climate
recovery effort.67 But charting a course forward first requires understanding the
failed governance that led us to where we are. The next section probes the
dysfunction of statutory law that, over the course of a half century, delivered the
climate crisis to the doorstep of the world.
IV. LED ASTRAY: THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTORY LAW68
In the wake of Earth Day, 1970, Congress passed a multitude of statutes, such as
the Clean Air Act,69 the Clean Water Act,70 the Endangered Species Act,71 the
National Environmental Policy Act,72 and others. These new laws, and others that
followed on the state and local levels, spawned a huge environmental bureaucracy

64. See Lisa Friedman, Biden’s Fossil Fuel Moves Clash with Pledges on Climate Change
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/climate/biden-fossil
-fules-climate-Willow.html [https://perma.cc/C6HR-HXXW].
65. See id.
66. See Oliver Milman & Lauren Gambino, ‘This Is Our Last Chance’: Biden Urged to
Act as Climate Agenda Hangs by a Thread, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www
.theguardian.com/environment/2021/oct/18/joe-biden-climate-crisis-legislation?CMP=oth_baplnews_d-1 [https://perma.cc/67E2-GYSJ]. The problem is greatly magnified due to the
glaring conflict of interests some members of Congress have when voting on climate
legislation. See Bryan Metzger, Joe Manchin, Who is Holding up Crucial Climate Change
Initiatives in Biden's Reconciliation Bill, Collects $500,000 a Year from Coal Stocks
Dividends: Report, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/senatorjoe-manchin-half-million-year-coal-stocks-climate-crisis-2021-9
[https://perma.cc/R43ZRZYL].
67. See Part XIV, XV (discussing the role of courts in climate crisis).
68. For a thorough explanation of the assertions in this section, see WOOD, NATURE’S
TRUST, supra note 12, Part I.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
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that exerted dominion over Nature. Victorious Earth Day reformers reasonably
believed that such agencies would carry out the protective goals of the statutes
citizens had fought so hard for, but instead, government quickly commandeered
environmental statutes to veer far afield from the public trust.73 Many agencies ended
up co-opted and manipulated by industry interests and used the statutes to favor
industry over the public’s interest in managing the ecological endowment they were
charged with protecting. The systemic dysfunction pervading most environmental
agencies today traces to a triangulation of dynamics.74 First, nearly every statute has
permits or other provisions that empower an agency to allow the very type of
destruction the statute was designed to prevent.75 Agencies characteristically use the
statutes to legalize unfathomable amounts of destruction, permit by permit. Permits for
water pollution, air pollution, wetlands destruction, and other harms are rarely
denied.76 The authorizing statutory provisions were never intended to swallow the
protective purposes of the laws, but they have.
Second (and relatedly), environmental statutes give agencies breathtaking
discretion to carry out the laws—to enact regulations, issue permits, and enforce (or
not) violations.77 This power came justified by one simple assumption: officials will
invoke their technical expertise on behalf of the public interest. The conferral of vast
discretion was one grand experiment in administrative law and presented the means
for agencies to gain enormous power over the nation’s ecology.
Third, industry soon figured out that discretion sets an open season to lobby
officials into bending the law to their favor. As soon as the agencies created new
regulations, industry started eroding them.78 Big money rides on an agency’s
environmental decisions, so the major corporations devote resources to influencing
agencies. The system of campaign contributions greases the wheels of such
influence.79 Presidents and governors often appoint agency heads with loyalty to the
industries that funded their campaigns.80 These political operatives use their
discretion to indulge their industry from inside the agency.81 Government officials in
a captured agency look at the industry in a different light—as a client the agency
must serve.
Despite its original goals, environmental law came to institutionalize a marriage
of government and industry. Collectively, environmental agencies rule over

73. These conclusions are developed in WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, and will
not be reiterated in depth here.
74. For discussion, see id. at chs. 2–4.
75. For discussion, see id. at 57–63.
76. For discussion, see id. at 64, 74–77 (explaining how agencies bankrupt ecological
wealth using environmental law).
77. For discussion, see id. at ch. 3 (describing three “portals of discretion”).
78. For discussion, see id. at 51–52.
79. For discussion, see id. at 84–5.
80. For discussion, see id. at ch. 1, and pp. 84–89. For reporting on the Trump
administration’s appointment of industry operatives, see David Roberts, Donald Trump is
Handing the Government Over to the Fossil Fuel Interests, VOX (June 14, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/6/13/15681498/trump-governmentfossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/2LK3-A7EA].
81. For discussion, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at 85–87.
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America’s natural resources, making decisions that are politically good for
themselves but bad for society and future generations—and this has been true for
both Democrat and Republican administrations (though some have proven far worse
than others). Fully in line with this failed statutory syndrome, government actors
deployed American environmental law to permit and promote a massive fossil fuel
industry despite its known peril to Humanity.82 Behind all of the coal fire plants, coal
strip mines, off-shore and on-shore oil drilling leases, fracking operations, oil and
gas pipelines, coal trains, trains containing Bakken crude oil, and every export
facility, lies affirmative permits, leases, and/or regulations allowing the destructive
activity.83 This diagnosis also suggests why, fifty years after its enactment, the Clean
Air Act84 still has not been used to comprehensively regulate greenhouse gas
emissions. Behind the thick shroud of environmental law, the executive branch of
government commits massive generational theft that pushes the entire world toward
collapse.
The Founders carefully devised three branches of government with dispersed
power and robust checks and balances to prevent a despotic ruler. American
democracy relies on each branch carrying out its role to keep power from
aggrandizing in one branch. Congress is supposed to make the law. Agencies are
supposed to carry out that law. And courts are supposed to enforce the law—not
only statutory law, but constitutional protections and fundamental rights. The
1970s reform and growth of agencies fundamentally restructured the balance of
power that underpins American environmental democracy, allowing power to swell
without meaningful constraint in the executive branch.85 In the statutory framework,
neither Congress nor the courts have provided a meaningful check on the Executive’s
colossal environmental destruction.
Congress has long failed to confront broad-scale problems such as biodiversity
loss, climate disruption, and ocean pollution, even as all worsened into a state of
emergency. Professor Richard Lazarus characterizes the neglect as “congressional
descent,” stating that, since the 1970s, Congress’ role in environmental lawmaking
has “virtually disappeared.”86 Campaign contributions, soaring to unprecedented
heights after the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission87 decision, incentivize individual legislators to make decisions to
benefit their private contributors rather than the public at large. Essentially, the
branch that is supposed to take the lead in national environmental policy has been
paid off to stay in the corner. A feeble and compromised Congress endangers

82. For a full account, see SPETH, supra note 58.
83. In their complaint, the Juliana plaintiffs chronicle the governmental permitting and
leasing schemes that promote these aspects of the fossil fuel energy system. See Complaint,
supra note 31, at 5–7, 38–51, 59–67.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
85. See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at ch. 5.
86. Richard J. Lazarous, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy
in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L. J. 619, 621–22 (2006).
87. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See Ian Vandewalker, Since Citizens United, A Decade of Super
PACs, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/citizens-united-decade-super-pacs [https://perma.cc/F5EA-8XF4].
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democracy by removing a significant governing branch from the equation of checks
and balances necessary to prevent totalitarian government.88
As to the crucial constitutional check and balance provided by the judicial branch,
that too diminished during the past half century as the statutory framework of
environmental law took hold. The next section explains the passive role that
continues as the dominant paradigm of judging environmental cases. It is imperative
to understand this passive role, because it defines the Juliana majority’s hands-off
approach to climate destruction, even as those judges acknowledged that the world
sits on the “eve of destruction.”89
V. THE ANTIQUATED JUDICIAL ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES: COURTS AS
PASSIVE UMPIRES
Courts remain uniquely positioned to force broad agency protection of
environmental resources. Standard trials consist of rigorous, adversarial fact-finding
proceedings that can penetrate complex questions of science. Courts can actively and
expeditiously formulate injunctive remedies to address the harm.90 Adept judges can
often use their leverage to bring parties to productive settlements that would not

88. WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at 105–08.
89. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Barry McGuire,
Eve of Destruction, on Eve of Destruction (Dunhill Records, 1965)).
90. Examples of structural injunctions are discussed at WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra
note 12, at 250–57. A recent example of a detailed injunction is found in Nw. Env't Def. Ctr.
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, No. 3:18-CV-00437-HZ, 2021 WL 3924046 (D.
Or. Sept. 1, 2021), where the U.S. District Court of Oregon found the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers in continued violation of the ESA in its management of hydro facilities that harmed
listed salmon species. Judge Marco A. Hernández devised an interim injunction with detailed
measures requiring the Corps to implement drawdown, spill, and specific fish management
actions at its facilities. He also established an Expert Panel “in which the parties’ technical
experts will confer and flesh out the implementation details of numerous interim mitigation
measures.” Such “implementation plans” developed by the Expert Panel were incorporated
into the Court’s interim injunction, which required Corps’ compliance with the plans. See id.,
slip op at 29–31. Judge Hernández further required the Corps to provide the court with status
reports on the implementation every six months. Id., slip op at 31. These kinds of measures
reflect elements of a structural injunction crafted to correct an agency that has demonstrated
longstanding violations. In an earlier Draft Order, the court observed:
Despite the requirements of the 2008 BiOp, the Corps has fought tooth and nail
to resist implementing interim fish passage and water quality measures that it
was supposed to begin implementing a decade ago, and that NMFS has been
recommending for years. The Court is disheartened by the fact that, when
compared to how the Corps should have proceeded had it complied with the
BiOp, much of the injunctive relief that the Court is now ordering can be
considered, in many respects, a giant leap backward. Consequently, the Court
has no patience for further delay or obfuscation in this matter and expects
nothing short of timely implementation of the injunctive measures and the
experts’ proposal outlining the parameters for those measures.
Draft Order, Nw. Env't Def. Ctr. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers & Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv, No. 3:18-CV-00437-HZ, slip op. at 12 (emphasis added).
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otherwise occur. But this effective judicial power is not characteristically tapped by
suits brought within the statutory frame, for four reasons.91 First, most statutory
claims are exceedingly narrow, focusing on one discrete agency action (such as one
permit or regulation). Such lawsuits work as blinders to the judges, hiding the
growing environmental catastrophe and pervasive agency dysfunction underlying the
challenged action. Second, the harm alleged in statutory cases is often procedural,
like an agency’s failure to do an Environmental Impact Statement or failure to list a
species under the Endangered Species Act. Procedural inquiries fail to address headon the substantive damage perpetrated by agencies using permits and lease
provisions to dispense public trust resources to private profiteers. Third, courts
invoke a strong “deference doctrine” to play a self-appointed wallflower role in
statutory cases. Long ago, judges decided that environmental law should be different
than other matters coming before them. Because the agencies were the keepers of
vast technical expertise, and because judges uncritically presumed that agencies
faithfully carried out the public interest as commanded by the statutes, courts decided
to give agency regulations and technical decisions a grand presumption of validity
or “deference.” The deference doctrine all but immunizes politicized agency action
because courts repress their standard scrutiny. Fourth, when environmental litigants
score statutory wins in court, the victories tend to result in narrow procedural
remands that simply return the decision to the offending agency with orders to repeat
the analysis and make the decision over again. This creates a simplistic “win-loss”
end to statutory environmental cases: the judge is finished with the matter. But quite
often, the same entrenched, politicized forces within the agency typically produce
another flawed decision—which will often again be challenged in court. This is the
spin cycle of environmental statutory law.
Over time, these dynamics, working fully in tandem, have caused all too many
judges to view environmental policy as the prerogative of the executive branch,
yielding little in the way of a judicial check. This entrenched, self-assigned judicial
view could be described as a “passive umpire” role for courts, and it has caused a
judicial retreat so dramatic as to subvert the courts’ assigned role in a checks-andbalances system of government. Crippled by judicial deference and meager remedies,
statutory environmental cases have largely failed to thwart the incessant ecological
barrage legalized by government agencies. In the article “A Wake-Up Call for
Judges,” Ninth Circuit Judge Alfred Goodwin lamented that the judicial branch has
“enfeebled itself,” contributing to a current state of affairs that “reveals a wholesale
failure of the legal system to protect Humanity from the collapse of finite natural
resources by the uncontrolled pursuit of short-term profits.”92
This history shows a failure of constitutional checks and balances leading to the
gravest and most urgent of threats. Accorded nearly full dominion over the nation’s
vital ecology, and yet captured by one of the nation’s most powerful industries,93

91. The propositions in this section are developed in WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note
12, at 108–13, and will not be iterated in depth here.
92. Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785, 785–86
(2015).
93. See, e.g., STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: EXXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER (2012);
RACHEL MADDOW, BLOWOUT: CORRUPTED DEMOCRACY, ROGUE STATE RUSSIA, AND THE
RICHEST, MOST DESTRUCTIVE INDUSTRY ON EARTH (2019); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES
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agencies breached, with impunity, their sovereign public trust obligations to protect
the atmospheric trust—the linchpin of survival across all Earth. Absent meaningful
congressional or judicial restraint, agencies allowed the fossil fuel industry to flood
the atmosphere with carbon emissions. President Trump, taking office at the eleventh
hour of this climate crisis, wielded a power never imagined by the Framers—to bring
the destruction of the nation and the world by accelerating fossil fuel development
past tipping points capable of pushing Earth irrevocably into a state of runaway
heating. With no meaningful constitutional rein, President Donald Trump and his
political appointees, including those at the Department of Justice, crusaded a
heedless executive branch blindly towards Humanity’s annihilation.
VI. THE “BIGGEST CASE ON THE PLANET”: JULIANA V. UNITED STATES
The Juliana v. United States case, filed in 2015 when Barack Obama occupied
the Oval Office, sought to break the climate crisis out of the destructive statutory
paradigm that had fueled it in the first place. Juliana was part of a wave of
Atmospheric Trust Ligation (ATL) that sought to enlist meaningful judicial review
and remedial action before it was too late to save the planet. The greatest challenge
of this campaign was confronting the mindset of government officials, judges, and
even environmental lawyers who had become mentally locked into a view of
environmental law as consigned to agency discretion operating within statutes. To
many, environmental cases were statutory cases, period.
The ATL climate strategy was conceived in 200794 and materialized in the form
of U.S. administrative petitions and lawsuits launched by the organization Our
Children’s Trust (OCT), in May 2011.95 Brought on behalf of young people against

AGAINST NATURE: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH AND HIS CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE
COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY (2004); HADYN WASHINGTON & JOHN COOK,
CLIMATE CHANGE DENIAL: HEADS IN THE SAND (2011).
94. This litigation approach was originated by the author. See Randall S. Abate,
Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream or Pipeline to Justice for
Future Generations? in CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 543, 552 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016). For the foundational
framework, see Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 99, 99 (William C.
G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009) [hereinafter Wood, 2009 ATL chapter], which
“outlines the contours of potential ‘atmospheric trust litigation’”; Mary Christina Wood,
Atmospheric Trust Litigation Across the World, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC
TRUST 99, 102 (Ken Coghill et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Wood, 2012 ATL chapter], which
explains the legal strategy of ATL.
95. See Matthew Brown & Associated Press, Climate Activists Target States with
Lawsuits, HARTFORD COURANT (May 4, 2011, 4:31 AM), https://www.courant.com
/sdut-climate-activists-target-states-with-lawsuits-2011may04-story.html
[https://perma.cc/37BB-XKLA]; see also Juliana v United States: The Climate Lawsuit,
CBSNEWS.COM (May 4, 2011, 5:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/video/juliana-v-unitedstates-the-climate-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/H8DH-JGMS]; Gabriel Nelson, Young Activists
Sue U.S., States over Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/05/05greenwire-young-activists-sue-us-states-over-

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 268

1/24/22 9:05 AM

2022]

CONFRONTING CLIMATE EMERGENCY

257

agencies in every state (and one lawsuit against the federal government), these cases
and petitions were premised on the public trust principle. They made the following
assertions: (1) the air and atmosphere, along with other vital natural resources, are
within the res of the public trust; (2) the legislature and its implementing agencies
are public trustees with inalienable sovereign obligations; (3) both present and future
generations of the public are beneficiaries of the public trust; (4) the government
trustees owe a fiduciary duty to protect the air, atmosphere, and climate system; and
(5) courts have authority to enforce these trust obligations.96 Recognizing that
looming tipping points necessitated a rapid and decisive response to the planet’s
atmospheric crisis, the ATL campaign turned to the judiciary for eleventh-hour relief.
Calibrating the requested remedy to the actual requirements of the atmosphere, the
ATL petitions and lawsuits demanded enforceable climate recovery plans from
government trustees to reduce carbon emissions at the rate called for by the best
available science, which had been iterated through a prescription developed by a
team of scientists led by the chief U.S. climate scientist, Dr. James Hansen.97
While some cases had early victories—including a Washington case in which the
judge declared a constitutional public trust and moved swiftly into the remedy stage,
emphasizing the “kids can’t wait” because climate chaos threatened their very
survival98—the thrust of the judicial approach over time largely reflected the passive
umpire model of judicial review. Without exception, state attorneys general
vehemently disclaimed any public trust obligation to their citizens and maintained
that the government defendants retained complete discretion to fashion a climate
response: in other words, courts should stay out of climate issues. Invoking a variety
of procedural grounds, including the political question doctrine, standing, deference,
and displacement, nearly all courts avoided involvement in the climate crisis.
Accordingly, several cases resulted in dismissal, some after painfully long and
protracted appeals.99 A statement by the judge dismissing the early federal case was

greenhouse-64366.html [https://perma.cc/AZ8T-8JVW] (reporting that fifty-two ATL
lawsuits were filed almost simultaneously across the country).
96. For an example of a complaint in a state ATL case, see Complaint, Chernaik v.
Oregon, Case No. 16-11-09273 (Cir. Ct. Lane Cnty, Or., May 19, 2011) (seeking declaration
that “State of Oregon, as trustee, has a fiduciary obligation to protect the atmosphere as a
commonly held public trust resource from the impacts of climate change for Plaintiffs and for
present and future generations of Oregonians.”). For discussion of the ATL campaign, see
Abate, supra note 94, at 543–69; id. at 552 (“ATL attempts to impose a legal duty on
governments to protect the atmosphere, and seeks to require governments to execute that duty
based on scientific data and implement a policy of shared responsibility with regard to
reducing CO2 emissions.”).
97. For the prescription, see Hansen et al., supra note 33. Dr. James Hansen served as
Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Dr. James Hansen, COLUM. CLIMATE
SCH.: THE EARTH INST., https://www.earth.columbia.edu/users/profile/james-e-hansen
[https://perma.cc/S9B2-FBSU].
98. Youths Secure Win in Washington State Climate Lawsuit: Judge Chastises State,
Rules from Bench Ordering State to Reduce Carbon Emissions, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST (Apr.
29, 2016), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/2016.04.29WAFinalRulingPR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6B3P-22BA].
99. See Blumm & Wood, supra note 4, at 68 n.367 (2017) (citing Alec L. v. Jackson, 863
F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing ATL federal suit on the basis of displacement
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indicative of an overriding judicial sentiment: agencies were “better equipped” than
courts to handle the climate crisis.100
Nevertheless, as a full-scale, coordinated movement with multiple suits connected
by a common base of both science and law, the ATL campaign steadfastly forged a
new path for environmental law: one premised on fundamental rights. As the climate
crisis grew obviously worse and more dangerous, the campaign took hold in the legal
field and across civil society, gaining substantial press101 and reframing the climate
obligations of the government as protecting young people’s fundamental right to
survive.102 In the fall of 2021, attorneys for youth plaintiffs were preparing for the
first ATL trial, in the Montana case (the second filed in that state), Held v. Montana.
Judge Kathy Seeley had earlier denied the state’s motion to dismiss the case, finding
that the youth could pursue their claims for declaratory relief.103 Moreover, in two
other cases that lost at the state supreme court level, vigorous dissents penned by the
Chief Justices in Oregon104 and Washington105 suggested a roadmap for what could

by Clean Air Act)). See also Chernaik v. Brown, 367 Or. 143 (2020) (affirming dismissal of
youths’ case).
100. Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015
WL 12591229, at *9 (Or. Cir. May 11, 2015) (stating that the climate recovery plan sought by
plaintiffs would ask the “[c]ourt to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature”).
101. See, e.g., Juliana v United States: The Climate Lawsuit, supra note 95.
102. Professor Abate observed in 2016, even before the recent wave of international ATL
victories, “ATL has been a primary focus of climate justice litigation and it has made
significant progress in advancing its theory in U.S. and foreign domestic courts.” Abate, supra
note 94, at 561. ATL cases have gained widespread support in the form of amicus briefs from
law professors, scientists, non-profit organizations, businesses, religious organizations, and
Congressional leaders. Many of these are posted on the website of Our Children’s Trust. See
Youth v. Gov: Juliana v. U.S., OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
juliana-v-us [https://perma.cc/2ZNG-KMT9]; State Legal Actions., OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/state-legal-actions [https://perma.cc/ZX93-HX5A].
103. Held v. Montana, Order on Motion to Dismiss, Civil Action CDV-2020-307 (Mont.
First Jud. D. Ct. Lewis and Clark County, Aug. 4, 2021), slip op. at 22 (dismissing plaintiffs’
claims for injunctive relief).
104. See Chernaik v. Brown, 367 Or. 143 (2020). Chief Justice Walters comprehensively
addressed the issues in the case and wrote:
The complexity of an issue may make a judicial decision more difficult, but it
does not permit this court to abdicate its role. . . . Courts also must not shrink
from their obligation to enforce the rights of all persons to use and enjoy our
invaluable public trust resources. How best to address climate change is a
daunting question with which the legislative and executive branches of our state
government must grapple. But that does not relieve our branch of its obligation
to determine what the law requires. . . . We should not hesitate to declare that
our state has an affirmative fiduciary duty to act reasonably to prevent
substantial impairment of our public trust resources. I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 186–87.
105. Aji P. v. State of Washington (No. 99564-8), slip op. at 1 (Wash. S. Ct. Oct. 6, 2021).
(Chief Justice Steven C. González and Justice G. Helen Whitener dissenting to the Washington
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be future majority opinions discerning a role for courts to hold government
accountable for its role in destroying the climate system.
The American ATL campaign inspired efforts in many other nations, some led by
OCT and others in collaboration with OCT.106 The global litigation framed the
question of judicial involvement in a glaring context of moral responsibility. Courts
of other nations repudiated the deferential stance typical of the American judiciary
and engaged deeply in the task of holding their governments accountable, as this
Article later recounts.107
In 2015, after the ATL campaign was well underway, Juliana v. United States
broke onto the climate scene. Filed in the U.S. District Court of Oregon against the
Obama administration on behalf of twenty-one youth plaintiffs, this was the first
federal civil rights case ever brought in the United States to allege that the climate
crisis was infringing on youth plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights. The
plaintiffs asserted constitutional claims to a stable climate system based on both the
public trust principle and substantive due process protections of the Fifth
Amendment that secure rights to life, liberty, and property. Punctuating the
remarkable course of the Juliana litigation is the pathbreaking opinion by federal
district court judge, Hon. Ann Aiken, a stunning dissent by Judge Staton in the Ninth
Circuit appeal, and the undaunted perseverance of the young plaintiffs and their
attorneys in the face of relentless, unprecedented tactics by U.S. Department of
Justice attorneys who have continually aligned public legal resources with industry
interests. Despite legal setbacks, the moral force of this case has undoubtedly moved
the arc of litigation across the world toward climate justice.

Supreme Court’s refusal to review a court of appeal’s decision dismissing the youths’ case).
Chief Justice González wrote,
This case is an opportunity to decide whether Washington’s youth have a right
to a stable climate system that sustains human life and liberty. We recite that
we believe the children are our future, but we continue actions that could leave
them a world with an environment on the brink of ruin and no mechanism to
assert their rights or the rights of the natural world. This is our legacy to them
described in the self-congratulatory words of judicial restraint. Today, the court
declined the important responsibility to seriously examine their claims.
Id. at 1. Both Justices found that declaratory relief would have provided a meaningful remedy,
and that the Court shirked its obligations to review the youths’ constitutional claims: “Even
though an ‘issue is complex and no option may prove wholly satisfactory,’ the judiciary should
not 'throw up its hands and offer no remedy at all.’ McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d 477, 546,
269 P.3d 227 (2012).” Aji P., slip op at 3. Prior to the Court’s ruling, former King County
Superior Court Judge Hollis Hill urged the Washington Supreme Court to take review of the
case, writing in an opinion editorial, “When the government denies the rights of the public,
courts must step in, declare the law and order the political branches to comply with the
constitution.” Hollis Hill, Let Youth Have Day in Court Over Climate Change, SEATTLE TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/let-youth-have-day-in-court-overclimate-change/ [https://perma.cc/PHB2-VRKM].
CHILDREN’S
TRUST,
106. Global
Legal
Actions,
OUR
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/global-legal-actions [https://perma.cc/5SDH-NKVR].
107. See infra section XV.
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Characteristic of ATL strategy, Juliana mounted a system-wide challenge.
Plaintiffs collectively sued all federal agencies responsible for U.S. energy policy,
including the Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation,
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior, the State Department,
Council on Environmental Quality, Department of Defense, and Department of
Commerce.108 The complaint comprehensively inventoried the U.S. fossil fuel
energy system and chronicled its affirmative governmental support over decades
through massive subsidies, regulatory permits, export permits, and approvals for
leasing, drilling, and mining on public lands and offshore areas.109 Describing a
pattern that “shock[s] the conscience,”110 the youth plaintiffs alleged,
For over fifty years, the United States of America has known that [CO2]
pollution from burning fossil fuels was causing global warming and
dangerous climate change, and that continuing to burn fossil fuels would
destabilize the climate system on which present and future generations
of our nation depend for their wellbeing and survival. Defendants also
knew the harmful impacts of their actions would significantly endanger
Plaintiffs, with the damage persisting for millennia. Despite this
knowledge, Defendants continued their policies and practices of
allowing the exploitation of fossil fuels . . . . Defendants have acted with
deliberate indifference to the peril they knowingly created.111
Detailing grave and irreparable harm from climate disruption, the plaintiffs
charged that “[t]he present level of [greenhouse gas emissions] and [associated]
warming, both realized and latent, are already in the zone of danger,” and asserted
that “our country is now in a period of ‘carbon overshoot,’ with early consequences
that are already threatening and that will, in the short term, rise to unbearable unless
[the government] take[s] immediate action.”112 Further, they contended, the
government has no plan to control GHG emissions to protect the life systems crucial
to plaintiffs’ survival. The Juliana plaintiffs thus sought, in addition to declaratory
relief, a judicial order requiring government defendants “to prepare and implement
. . . an enforceable national remedial plan” to stabilize the climate system in
accordance with the best available science.113
Carefully crafted to avoid separation of powers concerns while impelling an
effective, broad-scale judicial remedy, Juliana v. United States adopted an approach
characteristic of past civil rights institutional litigation. The Juliana attorneys sought
to harness a lineage of historic decisions developing meaningful remedial plans that

108. The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law of Columbia University has assembled the
docket for public access. Climate Change Litigation Databases, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://climatecasechart.com [https://perma.cc/D5A8-9YQQ]. Our
Children’s Trust also maintains a website chronicling the litigation, which is sometimes called
“Youth v. Gov.” Youth v. Gov: Juliana v. U.S., OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/juliana-v-us [https://perma.cc/2ZNG-KMT9].
109. See Complaint, supra note 31, at 51–63.
110. Id. at 86.
111. Id. at 3, 5 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 5–6.
113. Id. at 95.
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forced errant and oppressive government actors into constitutional compliance. Such
a remedy structure could bring unparalleled judicial leverage to the climate
emergency and compel government defendants to address the crisis with all
deliberate speed. A judicially-forced remedy scaled to the systemic causes of harm—
the fossil fuel energy system—would obviate the need for endless “Whac-A-Mole”
challenges to the many thousands of scattered actions implementing government’s
energy policy.114 It is seemingly the only judicial measure that, at this crucial
moment, responds to the reality of tipping points. As scientists explained in an
amicus brief supporting ATL cases: “Judicial relief may be the best, the last, and, at
this late stage, the only real chance to preserve a habitable planet for young people
and future generations.”115
The envisioned judicial role is supervisory, characteristic of structural injunctions
arising from cases involving civil rights, treaty rights, education funding, prisoners’
rights, and complex zoning situations.116 By supervising, but not devising, remedial
plans, courts may carefully observe their constitutionally appointed role. While a
court would not itself devise the pathways to decarbonization, it could force the other
branches to do so. This Article terms such a judicial posture as exercising “comity
deference,” in that the court’s engagement finds precise limits in the constitutionally
defined roles vested in the three branches of government. Reevaluating the judicial
role constantly as the remedial process takes shape, courts invoke comity deference
to calibrate a remedy to the basic constitutional delineation of power. Department of
Justice lawyers in Juliana, however, utterly disregard the constitutionally tailored
comity deference and perpetuate a misleading characterization of courts taking over

114. Transcript of Sept. 13, 2016 Oral Argument at 59, Juliana v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-0517-TC), rev’d & remanded, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020). In the hearing on the government’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Aiken
expressed frustration at the government’s position that would require plaintiffs to bring
separate statutory actions to address the climate crisis. See id. at 69 (comments of Judge Aiken
to DOJ attorney Sean Duffy) (“So aren’t you asking [plaintiffs], instead of appreciating that
they are helping to deconstruct complexity and relook systemically at how to address a
complex problem, aren’t you instead asking them to continue to waste their resources and go
chasing small agency actions with no way to get at the broader complexity mosaic of the
damage being done as we speak?”). Judge Aiken also expressed dismay at the Duffy’s failure
to appreciate a court’s ability to force agencies to work “more in concert outside their silos”
and oversee a “complex, multiagency, multi-responsibility problem” that has thus far eluded
the government. Id. She emphasized the ability of a court to take a more systemic look at the
crisis and voiced surprise that the defendants were not “asking for the courts to help you move
[a solution] forward” but instead were conjuring “imaginary horribles about what we might
do by intervening,” and ignoring the court’s ability to “fundamentally play a role without
intervening over the boundaries of . . . our third branch obligation.” Id. at 69–70.
115. Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7,
Alec L. v. Jackson (No. C–11–2203 EMC) 2011 WL 8583134 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2011)
[hereinafter Hansen, Amici Curiae Brief], cited in Mary Christina Wood & Charles W.
Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right to a Healthy
Climate System: Judicial Recognition at Last, 6 WASH. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 633, 658 n.105
(2016).
116. For discussion, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at 230–57.

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 273

1/24/22 9:05 AM

262

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:239

policy.117 The next section briefly describes the well-established judicial exercise of
comity deference in the history of American jurisprudence.
VII. THE ENGAGEMENT ROLE OF COURTS ENFORCING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
As expressed by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”118 Over the
course of American history, our courts have repeatedly corrected longstanding,
systemic wrongs of political branches that infringe on the fundamental rights of
citizens. The judiciary has the unique and singular duty to both declare constitutional
rights and prevent such political acts that would curb or violate those rights.119
Familiar instances of large-scale institutional litigation in modern American history
include the cases that achieved busing to desegregate schools,120 the treaty rights
cases that assured a fair share of fish for Indian treaty fishers,121 cases instituting
prison condition reform,122 and cases relating to land use and low-income housing.123
Unlike typical statutory suits against government agencies that end in a simple,
binary “win-loss” result, institutional litigation characteristically engages the court
in a complex multi-faceted remedy, which may last decades.124 Such remedies aim
to break down, scrutinize, and reform those institutional dynamics and practices that
cause the government to repeatedly violate fundamental rights of citizens. These
cases are designed to address long-standing violations baked into an entire
institution’s system and forge new ground in bringing about enduring constitutional
and civil rights compliance. Institutional judicial remedies can aim prospectively,
sweep broadly, and respond to a myriad of scientific and management challenges.
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to describe these engagements as occasions
for “mercy and practicality.”125
The severe breakdown of agencies has spurred this form of judicial intervention
in a number of contexts. The desegregation cases of the 1950s and 1960s displayed

117. See, e.g., Appellants’ Reply Brief at 24, Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159 (No. 6:15-cv-0517AA) (“In derogation of these normal workings of democracy, Plaintiffs seek to put a single
district court, at the behest of a handful of litigants, in charge of directing American energy
and environmental policy.”).
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
119. See id. at 167.
120. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975); Washington v.
Washington State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1
(1992); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
123. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976).
124. For discussion, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, ch. 11; see also Mary
Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part II): Asserting a Sovereign
Servitude to Protect Habitat of Imperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REV. 355, section V (2001).
125. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (quoting Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944)).
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the most notorious judicial administrative role as courts undertook detailed
management of entire school busing systems. But an ensemble of other U.S. cases
dealing with prison overcrowding, treaty fishing rights, dam operations, school
funding, and land use issues also exemplifies judicial vigor and innovation in
addressing bureaucratic delinquency.126 In a climate case, the court must perforate
the legal dysfunction that hurls society toward ecological collapse and force the
government to design a remedial plan aimed towards rapid decarbonization and
drawdown. Institutional litigation shows several features that mark the court’s role
in devising a remedy for government violations of constitutional rights.127
The anchoring sidewalls to a remedy lie in a declaratory judgment, which
precisely describes and often quantifies government’s obligations. For example, in
the landmark treaty fishing cases, courts declared the tribes’ right to take up to 50
percent of the harvestable quantities of fish—a clear and quantifiable interpretation
of the relevant treaty language that secured the right.128 Declaratory judgments may
also develop a series of goals tied to detailed timeframes to carry out specified
obligations. Such “benchmarks” arise out of a court’s practical recognition that
agencies otherwise will tend to procrastinate indefinitely in achieving compliance.
A next stage requires the government defendants to develop a remedial plan
containing measures to bring the agencies into constitutional compliance. This stage
often entails scientific and technical analysis and more data, along with rigorous
exploration of various alternatives. In order to prevent these complex remedial issues
from clouding the predicate task of defining the plaintiffs’ basic rights and
government’s consequent obligations, courts often bifurcate institutional cases into
a “liability” stage and a “remedy” stage. The liability stage allows the court to specify
legal obligations in a declaratory judgment, while the remedy stage demands a more
innovative judicial role to supervise the parties in crafting a plan. During this stage,
the court invokes comity deference to delineate the continuing judicial role as
constrained by the Constitution’s separation of powers.
Institutional litigation often involves ongoing court supervision to ensure proper
execution of the plan and to bring the remedy to fruition over time. The case remains
open under the ongoing jurisdiction of the court so that parties can challenge aspects
of the remedy implementation without bringing an entirely new lawsuit. Judges
usually require periodic reports to the court (at regular intervals of three or six
months, for example) to ensure that the government meets the benchmarks in timely
fashion.
Courts managing institutional cases often drill down into deep levels of
complexity. Accordingly, a court may appoint a special master to handle thorny
factual issues, make determinations on reoccurring matters arising within the case,
and recommend how the court should rule in particular circumstances. Courts, for
example, used special masters to administer structural injunctions in the California
prison litigation and in the Pacific Northwest treaty fishing cases.129

126. For detailed discussion of these cases, see WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at
230–57.
127. See id.
128. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 1975).
129. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011); Washington, 520 F.2d at 676; see also
WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at 250.
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During the course of institutional litigation, courts will often provide partial relief
to stop ongoing violations or damage through targeted orders. These could be thought
of as “backstop injunctions” to keep the damage from getting worse. Usually tailored
as narrowly as possible, these orders nevertheless respond to the urgency of the
situation. For example, in the California prison cases, a backstop injunction issued
after years of litigation to require release of thousands of prisoners in order to prevent
dire consequences of overcrowding.130
One of the most promising aspects of institutional litigation is the opportunity for
meaningful agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant agencies to drive forward
a solution—one that otherwise might not occur outside of the litigation context. If
the parties can agree on management parameters, these details can be wrapped into
a consent decree that carries the ongoing force of a court order. Consent decrees can
provide relief that exceeds the scope of relief the court could have awarded after a
trial.131
Consent decrees are used in multiple contexts of longstanding government
violations. One notable example in the environmental context arose from the treaty
fishing case, U.S. v. Oregon, handled by Judge Belloni, U.S. District Court of
Oregon. The litigation culminated in a consent decree and Columbia River Fish
Management Plan (CRFMP)—a model of judicial administration that gained
nationwide acclaim.132 The CRFMP, which has undergone various iterations over the
course of several decades, established a system of co-management between nine
sovereigns (states, tribes, and the federal government) managing treaty fisheries in
the Columbia River Basin.133 The CRFMP set forth detailed management criteria for
each fishery, established technical and policy committees, and created a dispute
resolution process that involved the court only as a last resort. The court appointed
an expert advisor to inform the judge on scientific matters and to help ensure the
scientific integrity of the process. By allowing the sovereign parties to identify points
of agreement and work out the details of a remedy using their own administrative
and scientific expertise, the consent decree process can create an enduring remedy
structure to fit complex institutional and biological circumstances.
These notable examples of institutional litigation underscore the substantial range
and flexibility courts have to remedy systemic injustice. This remedy structure brings
vital government accountability that is otherwise lost when courts wholly abdicate
their role in enforcing fundamental rights. While the scope and complexity of the
climate emergency may be without precedent, it embodies the same danger and
autocracy that motivated this nation’s Founders to create a balanced government with
a firm role for the courts to protect life, liberty, and property. After decades of
unchecked political annexation by the executive branch in the environmental realm,

130. Brown, 563 U.S. at 545.
131. See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
132. See United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456, 1469 (D. Or. 1988) (describing and
approving Columbia River Fish Management Plan). For a detailed discussion, see Wood,
supra note 124, at 427–37.
133. See United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. at 1469 (describing and approving
Columbia River Fish Management Plan); see also Sohappy v. Smith (United States v. Oregon),
302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). The CRFMP is described and analyzed in Wood, supra note
124, at 427–37.
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the Juliana case once again forces the judiciary to stake out its exact place in
American democracy.
VIII. “NO ORDINARY LAWSUIT”: JUDGE AIKEN’S PATHBREAKING OPINION
Judge Aiken’s opinion in the Juliana case opened a new era of American
environmental law. It was the first federal U.S. decision that pronounced a
constitutional right of climate stability. While courts of other nations were well along
the path of framing environmental rights as fundamental rights with constitutional
force, American environmental law, as described earlier, had been shoved into long
and narrow tunnels of statutory commands. Endorsing the plaintiffs’ framing of the
lawsuit, the court called this a “civil rights action”134 in the first sentence of the
opinion, and recognized early in the analysis, “This is no ordinary lawsuit.”135 The
government attorneys fought hard to force this lawsuit back into the statutory realm,
claiming there was no relief outside of statutes; Department of Justice (DOJ)
attorneys held firm that courts should have no role in the climate crisis and should
leave the nation’s energy policy to the unsupervised discretion of the Executive
Branch—the same branch that had created the catastrophe in the first place.136 Judge
Aiken rejected this framing, writing,
Throughout their objections, defendants and intervenors attempt to
subject a lawsuit alleging constitutional injuries to caselaw governing
statutory and common-law environmental claims. They are correct that
plaintiffs likely could not obtain the relief they seek through citizen suits
brought under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, or other
environmental laws. But that argument misses the point. This action is
of a different order than the typical environmental case. It alleges that
defendants’ actions and inactions—whether or not they violate any
specific statutory duty—have so profoundly damaged our home planet
that they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life and
liberty . . . . A deep resistance to change runs through defendants’ and
intervenors’ arguments for dismissal . . . .137
Later in the opinion, the court again signaled departure from the dominant frame of
environmental law by observing: “Federal courts too often have been cautious and
overly deferential in the arena of environmental law, and the world has suffered for
it.”138 Denying the government’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Aiken found that the
plaintiffs had set forth viable claims to fundamental rights under both the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution and the public trust principle, which she
recognized as an attribute of sovereignty itself, predating the Constitution, applicable
to the federal government, and enforceable through the Due Process Clause.139 In

134. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1234 (D. Or. 2016).
135. Id.
136. See Argument for Federal Defendants by Sean Duffy, Transcript of Sept. 13, 2016
Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 67–68.
137. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261–62.
138. Id. at 1262.
139. Id. at 1260 (“Public trust claims are unique because they concern inherent attributes
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words that would sweep the world, Judge Aiken declared, “I have no doubt that the
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free
and ordered society.”140
There are many aspects of this decision worthy of analysis, but this Article will
focus on the role of the court as embraced by Judge Aiken. By squarely positioning
this case as a civil rights case, she drew forth a judicial function that had
characterized decades of institutional litigation as described above. Emphasizing the
court’s duty to enforce constitutional rights, the court stated, “Even when a case
implicates hotly contested political issues, the judiciary must not shrink from its role
as a coequal branch of government.”141
Among many other procedural defenses asserted in the case, the industry
intervenors raised the political question doctrine, which holds that some questions
are more appropriate for resolution by the political branches without court
intervention.142 The political question doctrine was purposed to help courts navigate
the sometimes amorphous boundaries separating the constitutional roles of the three
branches of government.143 The intervenors argued that this doctrine formed an
absolute bar to the Juliana case because, in their view (perhaps a result of circular
reasoning), climate harm fell within the sole purview of the executive branch, not the
courts. As previously explained, this had long been the government’s framing of all
environmental issues, designed to justify unchecked power in the executive branch.
Recognizing that the political question doctrine calls upon courts to balance
“profoundly” important interests to protect both the constitutional separation of
power structure, on one hand, and preserve the role of courts in adjudicating valid
disputes, on the other hand, Judge Aiken rejected the bar-all approach of the
intervenors, stating, “A court cannot simply err on the side of declining to exercise
jurisdiction when it fears a political question may exist; it must instead diligently
map the precise limits of jurisdiction.”144
Judge Aiken carefully parsed through the governing factors declared in the
seminal case, Baker v. Carr, and determined that none of the factors precluded
judicial engagement. The most important of these criteria are: (1) a demonstrable
commitment to a non-judicial branch of government; (2) a lack of judicially
manageable standards for resolving an issue; and (3) the impossibility of deciding
the dispute without an initial policy choice clearly appropriate for non-judicial

of sovereignty. The public trust imposes on the government an obligation to protect the res of
the trust. A defining feature of that obligation is that it cannot be legislated away.”); id.
(“[P]laintiffs' public trust rights both predated the Constitution and are secured by it.”).
140. Id. at 1250.
141. Id. at 1263.
142. Id. at 1236 (grouping defenses asserted by government defendants and intervenors).
While the government defendants did not explicitly raise the political question argument in
their briefs supporting their Motion to Dismiss, they raised it later in a Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Judge Aiken found that those
arguments largely reiterated the ones the court had earlier rejected in denying the defendants’
Motion to Dismiss. Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1085 (D. Or. 2018).
143. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
144. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1236.
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discretion.145 With respect to the first, the court catalogued decisions showing the
rarity of cases decided under this factor. She determined that climate, while certainly
a subject of executive action, was not textually committed to that branch under the
Constitution. As to the second factor, attorneys for the intervenors had argued that
courts lacked standards to apply to a climate case arising outside of the narrow
confines of express statutory provisions. Judge Aiken wrote, “[p]laintiffs could have
brought a lawsuit predicated on technical regulatory violations, but they chose a
different path . . . . Every day, federal courts apply the legal standards governing due
process claims to new sets of facts.”146
The third Baker factor squarely addresses the judicial role in fashioning relief for
any violations declared by the court. In this regard, it is important to recognize the
distinctions between declaratory relief and a structural injunction that may require a
remedial plan and engage the court in supervising the plan. The court found neither
role categorically excludes the Juliana case from judicial review. As to the
declaratory relief, the court explained:
Plaintiffs do not seek to have this Court direct an individual agency to
issue or enforce any particular regulation. Rather, they ask the Court to
declare the United States’ current environmental policy infringes their
fundamental rights, direct the agencies to conduct a consumption-based
inventory of United States CO2 emissions, and use that inventory to
“prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase
out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2 so as
to stabilize the climate system and protect the vital resources on which
Plaintiffs now and in the future will depend.” This Court could issue the
requested declaration without directing any individual agency to take any
particular action.147
As to the judicial role in fashioning remedial relief, attorneys for the fossil fuel
intervenors argued that the court could not devise an injunctive remedy without
violating the separation of powers. The court rejected that argument, signaling a
process of ongoing evaluation and exercise of what this Article calls “comity
deference,” as discussed above. Judge Aiken wrote:
Should plaintiffs prevail on the merits, this Court would no doubt be
compelled to exercise great care to avoid separation-of-powers problems
in crafting a remedy. The separation of powers might, for example,
permit the Court to direct defendants to ameliorate plaintiffs’ injuries but
limit its ability to specify precisely how to do so. Cf. S. Burlington Cnty.
N.A.A.C.P. v. Mt. Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975) (leaving
to municipality “in the first instance at least” the determination of how

145. Id. Other criteria Justice Brennan identified were (1) the impossibility of a court
resolving an issue without expressing a lack of respect to coordinate branches; (2) an unusual
need to adhere to a political decision already made; and (3) the potential of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various branches to the same issue. Id. The intervenordefendants in Juliana argued only the first three of the Baker factors.
146. Id. at 1239.
147. Id.
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to remedy the constitutional problems with a local zoning ordinance).
That said, federal courts retain broad authority “to fashion practical
remedies when confronted with complex and intractable constitutional
violations.”148
“In any event,” Judge Aiken noted, “speculation about the difficulty of crafting a
remedy could not support dismissal at this early stage.”149
Judge Aiken’s conception of the court’s role positions the Juliana case in line
with the institutional litigation that is a formative part of this country’s judicial
history. As earlier noted, American jurisprudence shows many examples of
“structural-reform” injunctions requiring institutions to change behavior.150 In an
encompassing statement, Judge Aiken declared, “There is no need to step outside the
core role of the judiciary to decide this case. At its heart, this lawsuit asks this Court
to determine whether defendants have violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. That
question is squarely within the purview of the judiciary.”151 Moreover, rather than
positioning this case as a “win-loss” case (typical of statutory cases) in which the
court plays a passive umpire role, Judge Aiken signaled the court’s role as one of
ongoing engagement, carrying out its duties as a coequal branch of government.
During oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss, the Obama administration’s DOJ
attorney, Sean Duffy, continually urged dismissal on the basis that plaintiffs’ only
remedy was statutory.152 Judge Aiken asked why the government would not welcome
judicial involvement to help push climate action “with all deliberate speed,”
suggesting that the court’s institutional pressure as a “third branch of government . .
. [with] shared responsibility”153 could advance the climate solutions in the other
branches. Distinguishing this litigation, which challenges the system as a whole,
from the statutory approach urged by Duffy, Judge Aiken expressed the need to
“break down silos” and stated,
I understand your compartmentalized arguments. This poses a different
situation, and that is having a mosaic approach to the way the agencies
work in conjunction with one another. . . . I think there is an opportunity
because there is so much common ground [to] recognize the problem,
and you can help fashion your own solution that’s a broader solution and
welcome that other people are keeping the pressure on you.154
Indicating the productive potential for a court-supervised settlement, Judge Aiken
referred to a consent decree negotiated with the Portland Police Department and the
Justice Department, observing that the court had brought together the parties and,

148. Id. at 1241–42.
149. Id. at 1242.
150. Ninth Circuit Holds that Developing and Supervising Plan to Mitigate Anthropogenic
Climate Change Would Exceed Remedial Powers of Article III Court. — Juliana v. United
States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020), 134 HARV. L. REV. 1929, 1933 (2021) [hereinafter Ninth
Circuit Holds].
151. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1241.
152. Transcript of Sept. 13, 2016 Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 13–20.
153. Id. at 14–15.
154. Id. at 12, 15–16.
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rather than directing the actions to be taken, supervised the process to make sure that
all parties moved forward with “all deliberate speed”155 to resolve the problem.
With this vision of judicial involvement, Judge Aiken rejected the government’s
Motion to Dismiss and later set a trial date. A process of massive discovery ensued,
leading to a final trial date of October 29, 2018. In preparation, plaintiffs gained
declarations from their twenty-one experts on topics including: (1) the government’s
knowledge of the danger of the fossil fuel system; (2) the climate reality requiring
massive and urgent decarbonization to avoid tipping points; (3) the viable
decarbonization pathways that would be economically feasible; and (4) the
significant impacts of the climate crisis on youth plaintiffs’ physical and mental
health. The evidence assembled by the attorneys comprises many thousands of pages
and remains available to litigants around the world through the Sabin Center’s
Climate Chart.156 A trial in a federal district court would have marked the first time
in American history that the U.S. government’s fossil fuel agenda would have been—
quite literally—put on trial; the opportunity to expose governmental malfeasance was
momentous. No other forum—certainly not the narrow and cumbersome agency
processes, nor the politicized, distracted forums of Congress—could provide the
rigorous, evidence-based, structured process of a court trial for getting at the truth.
Many referred to the upcoming proceeding as the “Trial of the Century.”157
The district court planned to conduct Juliana as a standard bifurcated trial
(characteristic of institutional litigation), separating the trial into a liability phase and
a remedial phase.158 Given the evidence already in the record prior to trial, there
seemed a strong likelihood that a liability phase would end in a declaratory judgment
outlining the constitutional due process and/or public trust violations and
illuminating the science defining the right to a stable climate system capable of
supporting life on Earth.159 Specific elements of the government’s climate obligation
would likely emerge from this phase, setting the sidewalls for a remedial phase,
which would follow. The opportunity for climate progress in this phase was
profound, as a trial on the remedy would provide the forum for scrutinizing
alternative pathways towards decarbonization and carbon drawdown, charted by
experts. Judge Thomas M. Coffin, as the magistrate judge in the case, was positioned
to vet the proposed remedies, hone in on exactly what the plaintiffs proffered, find
areas of agreement, and sift out any remedies that fell outside of the court’s
constitutional purview. Had DOJ attorneys dedicated their office and public
resources to solving the climate problem rather than to taking a litigious defensive

155. Id. at 13.
156. See supra note 108.
157. Jessica Wentz, The Trial of the Century: A Preview of How Climate Science Could
Play Out in the Courtroom, Courtesy of Juliana v. United States, COLUM. CLIMATE L. BLOG,
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2019/01/07/the-trial-of-the-century-a-previewof-how-climate-science-could-play-out-in-the-courtroom-courtesy-of-juliana-v-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/L5JW-SZZY ] (Jan. 7, 2019); David Solnit, The Climate Trial of the
Century, 350 BLOG (Nov. 2, 2018)., https://350.org/youthvgov-juliana-climate-trial-ofcentury/ [https://perma.cc/83R6-HEFU].
158. See discussion at Blumm & Wood, supra note 4, at n. 143.
159. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250.
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posture (more characteristic of private attorneys), the nation may have commenced
on a productive path toward climate safety at this critical juncture.
But instead, the DOJ attorneys launched a barrage of unprecedented motions in
what seemed a desperate attempt to derail the trial. Their need to do so was obvious:
the scientific evidence produced at trial would prove devastating to an administration
bent on flooring the accelerator on fossil fuel production. Over the course of the next
four years, the case went four times to the Ninth Circuit and twice to the Supreme
Court on various motions, petitions for writs of mandamus, and requests for
interlocutory appeal, a procedure described as “hen’s-teeth rare.”160 These efforts
culminated in a premature appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.161 In

160. See, e.g., Camacho v. P.R. Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Section
1292(b) is meant to be used sparingly, and appeals under it are, accordingly, hen’s-teeth
rare.”). The procedural history of the Juliana case is iterated in the opinion of Judge Friedland,
dissenting to the Ninth Circuit’s order certifying appeal. This barrage of petitions filed by DOJ
attorneys exemplifies the massive use of public legal funds and expertise to derail trial rather
than forge a solution to the urgent climate crisis within a judicially supervised framework
proposed by the plaintiffs. See also infra n.164. Judge Friedland’s account of the DOJ motions
is quoted in full below to provide a sense of the government’s relentless efforts to derail this
case:
See Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon and Request for Stay of Proceedings in District Court, United
States v. U.S. District Court, No. 17-71692, Dkt. 1 (9th Cir. June 9, 2017)
(requesting a stay of district court proceedings and relief from the Ninth
Circuit); Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Motion for a Stay of
Discovery and Trial Under Circuit Rule 27-3, United States v. U.S. District
Court, No. 18-71928, Dkt. 1 (9th Cir. July 5, 2018) (same); Application for a
Stay Pending Disposition by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit of a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon and Any Further Proceedings in This Court and
Request for an Administrative Stay, United States v. U.S. District Court, No.
18A65 (U.S. July 17, 2018) (requesting a stay from the Supreme Court pending
Ninth Circuit review of mandamus petition); Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
Requesting a Stay of District Court Proceedings Pending Supreme Court
Review, Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3, United States v. U.S.
District Court, No. 18-72776, Dkt. 1 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) (requesting a stay
of district court proceedings from the Ninth Circuit pending Supreme Court
review of mandamus petition); Application for a Stay Pending Disposition of a
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon and any Further Proceedings in this Court and Request for
an Administrative Stay, In re United States, Applicants, No. 18A410 (U.S. Oct.
18, 2018) (bypassing the Ninth Circuit and requesting mandamus relief from
the Supreme Court); Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Emergency Motion
Under Circuit Rule 27-3, United States v. U.S. District Court, No. 18-73014,
Dkt. 1 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2018) (requesting a stay of district court proceedings
and relief from the Ninth Circuit).
Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176, slip op. at 6 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018) (Friedland,
J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1.
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retrospect, given the need for urgent climate action and the prospect of irrevocable
destruction to society from delaying solutions, these DOJ attorneys’ personal roles
and ethical choices in defending the Trump administration’s ruinous decisions should
not be overlooked.
The trial of the century did not happen.
IX. THE DERAILMENT OF JULIANA AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ABSTRACT APPEAL
Appellate review is ordinarily available only after a district court has entered a
final judgment, which usually follows a trial.162 Interlocutory (premature) appeals are
disfavored, because they interrupt the normal sequence of litigation. The role of a
trial court is to build a body of evidence, create an evidentiary record, and issue
findings of fact and law. It is a robust process that entails weighing significant
evidence and making discerning judgements. Appellate judges rely on this work of
the district court in order to inform their review. Without an evidentiary basis, the
case arrives on appeal as an abstract hypothetical, devoid of the facts that would give
the legal questions practical context and grounding. In the words of Judge Coffin,
recommending denial of a government motion, early appeals “put the cart before the
horse.”163
The process of a trial in the district court is particularly important to an appellate
court discerning whether a remedy is within the judicial branch’s appropriate
purview. Without a vetted, tangible remedy structure, the matter is all but “dead on
arrival” to an appellate court, because the case opens up a parade of hypothetical
wonderings and endless what-ifs. It is worth noting that two of the most far-reaching
and involved judicial remedies in institutional litigation—those involving
desegregation and treaty rights cases—were upheld on appeal, but only upon a welldeveloped record at the trial court level. Without the process of a trial judge carefully
discerning the court’s role and making judgments as to how the various remedial
components calibrate to the functions of each branch, the appellate court is left with
a case that is utterly vacuous and categorical—inviting an infinite scope of possible
remedy scenarios that could exceed judicial power. In other words, deviating from
the regular course of judicial process eliminates the opportunity for the trial judge to
exercise comity deference. This was the unfortunate posture of the Juliana case when
it arrived on early appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
In granting the government’s premature appeal, the Ninth Circuit was obliged to
issue what amounted to an advisory opinion without the benefit of a trial court record.
The dissenting judge who objected to the order granting interlocutory appeal before
the Ninth Circuit, Judge Friedland, believed the case should have proceeded to trial
because “the district court—having, among other things, direct experience with the
parties, knowledge of the status of discovery, and the ability to sequence issues for
trial—is far better positioned to assess how to resolve the litigation most

162. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
163. Findings & Recommendations at 15, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224,
1260 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 6:15-cv-01517TC).
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efficiently.”164 She was outnumbered by her two colleagues, Judges Thomas and
Berzon, both of whom approved of the premature appeal.
As the Juliana plaintiffs were awaiting oral argument, they filed a motion on
February 7, 2019, for an emergency preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit to
prevent approvals for 100 new fossil fuel infrastructure projects that the Trump
administration was poised to execute—encompassing pipelines, export facilities, and
coal and liquefied natural gas terminals. The plaintiffs stated:
The evidence shows that these systemic activities must be enjoined
immediately to preserve Plaintiffs’ ability to obtain a remedy in this case
that redresses their injuries . . . . The record shows Plaintiffs are already
suffering concrete harm to their persons, and these harms will worsen
and likely become irreversible in the absence of a preliminary injunction
. . . . Defendants made every effort to prevent Plaintiffs’ case from being
decided, all while accelerating fossil fuel development and increasing
GHG emissions to the point where it will become impossible for
Plaintiffs to protect themselves from the climate danger Defendants have
had a substantial role in causing.165
Scientists supported the plaintiffs’ motion with expert declarations expressing the
all-out urgency of stopping more fossil fuel development, stating, “Continuing U.S.
emissions at the present level for even two years will make it progressively more
difficult to stabilize the climate system in this century in order to preserve the critical
components for human life on this planet as we know it today,”166 and explaining
that, if we pass the point of no return, “climate change becomes irreversible for
centuries to millennia.”167 The emergency motion came in the wake of devastation
caused by one of the deadliest, most destructive, and most expensive wildfires in

164. Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176, slip op. at 6 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018)
(Friedland, J., dissenting). Judge Friedland also objected to the interlocutory appeal because it
“now effectively rewards the Government for its repeated efforts to bypass normal litigation
procedures by seeking mandamus relief in our court and the Supreme Court. If anything has
wasted judicial resources in this case, it was those efforts.” Id. at 6, n.1 (citing the serial
motions filed by DOJ attorneys seeking to thwart trial).
165. Urgent Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3(b) for Preliminary Injunction at 11–12,
Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2019). “GHG” refers to greenhouse
gas.
166. Declaration of Steve W. Running in Support of Plaintiffs’ Urgent Motion Under
Circuit Rule 27-3(B) for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Juliana v. United States (9th Cir. Feb.
7, 2019).
167. Declaration of Dr. James E. Hansen in Support of Plaintiffs’ Urgent Motion Under
Circuit Rule 27-3(B) for Preliminary Injunction at 6, Juliana v. United States, No. 18-36082
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2019). Scientists outside the litigation had strenuously warned that the United
States needed to leave most remaining fossil fuels “in the ground.” GREG MUTTITT, OIL
CHANGE INT’L, THE SKY’S LIMIT: WHY THE PARIS CLIMATE GOALS REQUIRE A MANAGED
DECLINE OF FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION
15
(2016),
https://priceofoil.org/
content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M8QPZ7J] (“We see that for a likely chance of keeping warming below 2°C, 68% of reserves must
remain in the ground. For a medium chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, 85% of reserves
must remain underground.”).
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recent U.S. history.168 The November 2018 Paradise Fire in California destroyed over
18,000 structures, burned two towns to the ground, and left over eighty people
dead—leaving no doubt that the climate crisis was gaining ferocity as the Juliana
case sat in the Ninth Circuit, headquartered just 172 miles away from Paradise,
California.169
X. ON THE “EVE OF DESTRUCTION”: THE MAJORITY’S OPINION
On January 17, 2020, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion
in the Juliana case, splitting into a majority (Judge Hurwitz writing for himself and
Judge Murguia) and a dissent (Judge Staton). Judge Hurwitz began his majority
opinion by announcing that the world is nearing “the ‘eve of destruction,’”170 and
that the United States is being pushed towards environmental “apocalypse” by its
own government pursuing a fossil fuel policy with full knowledge of the catastrophic
consequences.171 Atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, he observed, have
“skyrocketed”172 to levels not seen for almost three million years. Quite simply,
according to “copious expert evidence,” emissions from fossil fuel combustion will
“wreak havoc on the Earth’s climate if unchecked.”173 Recognizing that “[t]he
problem is approaching ‘the point of no return,’” Judge Hurwitz wrote, “[a]bsent
some action, the destabilizing climate will bury cities, spawn life-threatening natural
disasters, and jeopardize critical food and water supplies.”174 Convinced by the
extensive factual showings by the plaintiffs, Hurwitz also took notice of the
government’s general acceptance of the factual claims: “The government by and
large has not disputed the factual premises of the plaintiffs’ claims.”175
Despite all of this, Judge Hurwitz dismissed the children’s case, finding no
conceivable role for the judiciary, though he endorsed the framing of the case as a
civil rights lawsuit. The DOJ attorneys had tried hard to keep the case in a statutory
frame, arguing that the plaintiffs would need to bring their claims under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Judge Hurwitz rejected that argument, writing that
plaintiffs’ constitutional claims could “proceed independently of the review
procedures mandated by the APA.”176 He also assumed the existence of the
constitutional rights asserted by plaintiffs under the Due Process Clause and the

168. Alene Tchekmedyian, California Fires Live Updates: Camp Fire Death Toll at 86;
3 People Still Missing, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/california
/la-me-california-fires-woolsey-hill-camp-griffith-park-live-updates-htmlstory.html
[https://perma.cc/G97P-HAQQ]; Jack Nicas & Thomas Fuller, Wildfire Becomes Deadliest in
California History, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/11/12/us/california-fires-camp-fire.html [https://perma.cc/M37A-FYU5].
169. Tchekmedyian, supra note 168.
170. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020).
171. Id. at 1166 (“The record also conclusively establishes that the federal government has
long understood the risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.”).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1167.
176. Id. at 1168.
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public trust principle and found that important elements of standing were met in that
the plaintiffs suffered a concrete and particularized injury that was caused by the
government conduct.177 All of these findings, while not explored in any depth in this
Article, were momentous and represented substantial advances in climate litigation.
Remarkably, however, in an almost surreal detachment from the reality of the
climate emergency largely perpetrated by the government defendants, Judge Hurwitz
found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the last element of standing: a showing that
the injuries are likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision.178 He set the stage
for the discussion by saying that, to establish redressability, plaintiffs must show the
requested relief (1) is substantially likely to redress their injuries and (2) is within the
district court’s power to award.179 He divided the discussion into the request for
declaratory relief and the request for a broad structural injunction ordering a remedial
plan to decarbonize.180 But with no discussion at all, Judge Hurwitz simply denied in
a footnote181 the plaintiffs’ request for an emergency injunction to stop 100 new fossil
fuel projects—an injunction that surely seemed to meet both factors in that it would
have redressed plaintiffs’ alleged injuries by slowing the rate of carbon emissions
from the United States and was well within the traditional competency of the court
to award. Targeted injunctions are used to stop the building of oil pipelines and halt
coal leases, for example.182
As to the request for a declaratory judgment—a staple of judicial relief used to
determine the rights of the parties—Judge Hurwitz expressed, seemingly in nondispositive dicta, that under the first redressability factor, he was “skeptical” that
declaratory judgment would redress plaintiffs’ injuries.183 Of course, as noted above,
the court did not have a full factual record before it (as there had been no trial); thus,
the majority lacked a basis to evaluate whether declaratory relief would provide at
least partial redress.
As to the “crux of the plaintiffs’ requested remedy,”184 an injunction ordering a
remedial plan to decarbonize and draw down excess carbon in the atmosphere, Judge
Hurwitz recoiled at the prospect, barring all scenarios of judicial involvement.185 He
stated, “Reluctantly, we conclude that such relief is beyond our constitutional
power.”186 While he expressed skepticism that the first redressability prong would be
satisfied, because international sources of emissions remained beyond the United
States’ control, the focus of his analysis landed on the second factor. Judge Hurwitz
pinned his dismissal on a finding that the relief sought was not “within the power of
an Article III court . . . [as] any effective plan would necessarily require a host of

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1170.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1175, n. 10.
See, e.g., Tim Ryan, High Court Keeps Block on Keystone Pipeline Work,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 6, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/high-court-keeps
-block-on-keystone-pipeline-work/ [https://perma.cc/W9XB-KY6C].
183. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1170.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1165.
186. Id.
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complex policy decisions entrusted, for better or worse, to the wisdom and discretion
of the executive and legislative branches.”187 Oddly, having endorsed the
fundamental rights framework of the case, Judge Hurwitz reflexively reverted to the
passive, nonengagement judicial role that has so upset the balance of power over the
last half century since the environmental statutes were enacted. With this case of
profound gravity before the court, Judge Hurwitz yielded completely to the executive
branch—giving agency defendants unfettered discretion, even power, to destroy the
nation itself. Judge Hurwitz wrote: “[S]ome questions—even those existential in
nature—are the province of the political branches.”188
Judge Hurwitz found as a fatal shortcoming the lack of “limited and precise”189
standards for redressing the asserted violation. For this, he cited Rucho v. Common
Cause, a case that dismissed a partisan gerrymandering claim as presenting a political
question beyond the reach of the courts.190 Judge Hurwitz’s insistence on a “limited
and precise” legal standard as a predicate to fashioning remedial relief has been
roundly criticized as imposing a new and unfounded limitation on the ability of courts
to fashion remedial relief through structural reform injunctions.191 Courts regularly
devise standards, based on the evidence, to define the boundaries of constitutional
compliance. Landmark treaty fishing cases, for example, devised variations of a
50:50 harvest allocation. The California prison cases imposed a standard to reduce
populations to 137.5% of the buildings’ design capacity to mitigate overcrowding.192
The Mount Laurel land use litigation defined a fair housing standard using formulas
calibrated to an urban population.193 The standard envisioned by the Juliana
plaintiffs was tied to climate requirements: as emphasized by climate scientists, the
atmosphere must return to a pollution level below 350 ppm CO2.194 The role of the
trial court would be to consider expert scientific testimony defining this as the
appropriate standard by which to protect “a climate system capable of sustaining
human life.”195 Judge Aiken seemed prepared to do this, stating, “[P]laintiffs do not
ask this Court to pinpoint the ‘best’ emissions level; they ask this Court to determine
what emissions level would be sufficient to redress their injuries. That question can
be answered without any consideration of competing [policy and economic]
interests.”196
Beyond requiring a preexisting “limited and precise” legal standard, Judge
Hurwitz took issue with the court’s role in designing a remedial scheme, saying “it

187. Id. at 1171 (citing M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2018)).
188. Id. at 1173.
189. Id.
190. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019).
191. See Ninth Circuit Holds, supra note 150, at 1934.
192. WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 12, at 248–49 (discussing cases).
193. Id. at 249.
194. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173 (“The plaintiffs’ experts opine that atmospheric carbon
levels of 350 parts per million are necessary to stabilize the global climate.”). See supra note
33.
195. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
196. Id. at 1239 (citing Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2010 WL 99000, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010)).
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is beyond the power of an Article III court to order, design, supervise, or implement
the plaintiffs’ requested remedial plan.”197 His analysis rested on a
mischaracterization of the process, for a trial court would not itself, of course,
“design” a plan. That is up to the government defendants to do—as plaintiffs have
argued throughout the case. Judge Hurwitz could not imagine any scenario in which
a judicial role would be appropriate. His position emerged, almost undoubtedly, from
the posture of the case arriving in the Ninth Circuit as a totally abstract hypothetical
case. Had the trial court engaged in the effort of devising remedial relief, the panel
would have had a tangible judicial role to review—a record that likely would have
reflected a process of a trial judge exercising comity deference to observe appropriate
constitutional boundaries. Instead, stripping courts of any role, Judge Hurwitz
declared: “Not every problem posing a threat—even a clear and present danger—to
the American Experiment can be solved by federal judges.”198 He said recourse must
be through the political branches, even though they “have to date been largely deaf
to the pleas of the plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals.”199
Judge Hurwitz’s opinion, penned at this profoundly consequential moment in
human history, perpetuated the antiquated “passive umpire” view of the court system
that had come to define the courts’ role in environmental statutory cases.200 The logic
of this view would fold against the force of the dissenting opinion and, later, against
the clear thrust of cases from other countries in which judges rose to their axiomatic
duty of holding governments accountable—even in, or especially in, the climate
crisis.201 A statement by Hawaii Supreme Court Justice Wilson would prove

197. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171.
198. Id. at 1174.
199. Id. at 1175.
200. Professor Ann Carlson points out that Judge Hurwitz must have had in mind a
probable reversal by the U.S. Supreme Court if he delivered a victory to the plaintiffs. Ann
Carlson, Deciding a Climate Case in the Shadow of the Supreme Court, LEGALPLANET (Jan.
23, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/01/23/deciding-a-climate-case-in-the-shadow-of-thesupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/TU36-28RG] (“One can’t read the Ninth Circuit decision
without this context in mind. And when read in that context, the decision is, in my view, as
much of a victory for the plaintiffs as they could have hoped for.”). Yet there may have been
other ways to craft the opinion, focusing on the premature nature of the appeal and the vacuous
context in which the Ninth Circuit was operating. This ground, while not immune from
Supreme Court reversal, would have put the case in a much different posture for higher
scrutiny. As previously noted, in the normal progression of lawsuits, district courts have a trial,
weigh evidence, and make findings. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. The full
evidentiary record goes to the appellate court on review. By stepping out of this wellestablished sequence, the Ninth Circuit disrupted the litigation process as a whole, precedent
that the Supreme Court could have weighed apart from the merits of the Juliana case. In fact,
twice the Court had refused to grant the government’s petition for writ of mandamus seeking
premature review. See United States v. Juliana, 884 F.3d 830, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2018)
(detailing procedural history of case). Professor Patrick Parenteau said of the Hurwitz
decision, “Throwing the case out without hearing a single bit of evidence is outrageous.” Mark
Kaufman, The Kids’ Climate Lawsuit Just Got Thrown Out, MASHABLE
(Jan.
17,
2020),
https://mashable.com/article/kids-climate-lawsuit-thrown-out/
[https://perma.cc/HB4A-6MR9].
201. See infra Part XV.
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prescient: “As the archetypal peril of earth with collapsing ecosystems approaches,
legal narratives limiting judicial review . . . of carbon-caused global warming will
become anachronisms.”202
XI. “MY COLLEAGUES THROW UP THEIR HANDS”: JUDGE STATON’S DISSENT
Judge Josephine Staton authored an unsparing dissent that probed the judicial
obligations cast aside by the majority. Describing the current situation, she noted: “It
is as if an asteroid were barreling toward Earth and the government decided to shut
down our only defenses. Seeking to quash this suit, the government . . . insists it has
the absolute . . . unreviewable power to destroy the Nation.”203 Declaring, “[m]y
colleagues throw up their hands, concluding that this case presents nothing fit for the
Judiciary,”204 Judge Staton invoked the separation of powers to emphasize the courts’
role and constitutional duty to stop the executive branch from perpetuating “the
Nation’s willful destruction.”205 Unlike her colleagues, Judge Staton recognized a
sovereign duty to “preserve the Nation”206 and asserted that courts “serve as the
ultimate backstop”207 and remain singularly vested with the duty to enforce a
“perpetuity principle”—the right to an enduring America.208
Judge Staton marched steadily through an analysis of redressability and the
appropriate role of a court in institutional litigation, bringing the full civil rights
frame to this climate case. She invoked the same two-factor test that the majority
used—“First, as a causal matter, is a court order likely to actually remediate the
plaintiffs’ injury? If so, does the judiciary have the constitutional authority to levy
such an order?”209 She then portrayed the glaring reality of the situation to deride
both the government’s arguments for unrestricted power and the hesitation of her
colleagues to carry out their judicial role.
Judge Staton found that the requested remedy would likely address the plaintiff’s
injuries, even though it would not stop climate change altogether.210 Focusing on the
court’s ability to stop “irreversible . . . climate change,” she wrote:
[P]ractical redressability is not measured by our ability to stop climate
change in its tracks and immediately undo the injuries that plaintiffs
suffer today—an admittedly tall order; it is instead measured by our
ability to curb by some meaningful degree what the record shows to be

202. Michael D. Wilson, Climate Change and the Judge as Water Trustee, 48 ENV’T L.
REP. 10235, 10240 (2018).
203. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175 (Staton, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1177.
207. Id. at 1181.
208. Id. at 1178 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999)). While Judge Staton
did not invoke language of the public trust in recognizing a perpetuity principle, that principle,
embedded in sovereignty itself, requires the same protection of a sustaining ecological
endowment to support the nation through the generations. As fiduciary, government lacks the
sovereign power to bankrupt the nation’s natural wealth in service of private profiteers.
209. Id. at 1181.
210. Id.
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an otherwise inevitable march to the point of no return. Hence, the injury
at issue is not climate change writ large; it is climate change beyond the
threshold point of no return . . . .
The majority portrays any relief we can offer as just a drop in the bucket
. . . But we are perilously close to an overflowing bucket. These final
drops matter. A lot.211
Judge Staton found a definable standard to guide the case: “Here, the right at issue is
fundamentally one of a discernable standard: the amount of fossil-fuel emissions that
will irreparably devastate our Nation. That amount can be established by scientific
evidence like that proffered by the plaintiffs.”212
Judge Staton proceeded to address the court’s role and authority, positioning the
majority’s detached reluctance as both extreme and a violation of the separation of
powers that imposes duties on the court to vindicate constitutional rights. She wrote:
The majority laments that it cannot step into the shoes of the political
branches, but appears ready to yield even if those branches walk the
Nation over a cliff. This deference-to-a-fault promotes separation of
powers to the detriment of our countervailing constitutional mandate to
intervene where the political branches run afoul of our foundational
principles.213
Referring to the long history of institutional litigation necessary to remedy
constitutional infringement, Judge Staton noted the need of federal courts
[t]o fashion and effectuate relief to right legal wrongs. . . . Indeed,
sometimes “the [judicial and governance] roles briefly and partially
coincide when a court, in granting relief against actual harm that has been
suffered, . . . orders the alteration of an institutional organization or
procedure that causes the harm.”214
Ultimately, the demolishing force of Judge Staton’s opinion came from bringing
truth to power in stating, “In short, the government has directly facilitated an
existential crisis to the country’s perpetuity.”215 Iterating what the majority did not
contest, she said, “Plaintiffs submit ample evidence that there is a discernable
‘tipping point’ at which the government’s conduct turns from facilitating mere
pollution to inducing an unstoppable cataclysm in violation of plaintiffs’ rights.”216
Diminishing the majority’s “go to the political branches” approach, Judge Staton
emphasized that democratic processes “cannot override the laws of nature”: “[I]n this
sui generis circumstance, waiting is not an option. Those alive today are at perhaps

211. Id. at 1182 (first emphasis added) (second emphasis in original).
212. Id. at 1187.
213. Id. at 1183–84 (internal citation omitted).
214. Id. at 1184 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 350 (1996)).
215. Id. at 1177.
216. Id. at 1187.
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the singular point in history where society (1) is scientifically aware of the impending
climate crisis, and (2) can avoid the point of no return.”217
XII. REJECTION OF THE EN BANC PETITION
After the fateful Ninth Circuit ruling, the plaintiffs filed, on March 2, 2020, a
petition for an en banc review, which seeks a full rehearing and review by a panel of
eleven judges.218 To gain en banc review, a majority of Ninth Circuit judges must
vote in favor of the petition. Significant wrangling among judges over these petitions
can transpire behind the scenes even in ordinary cases. Given the stakes in this case
and a presidential election in (then) less than a year’s time—an election that
foreshadowed dramatic change in U.S. climate policy if Trump were defeated—it
may be reasonable to surmise that strategic cogitations marked discussion between
judicial chambers during the drama-filled months leading up to November 3, 2020
(U.S. Election Day), and perhaps too even during the three months beyond, as the
subversive posture of the Trump administration in assaulting the legitimacy of the
election erupted in the violent insurrection at the Nation’s capital on January 6 and
continued to cast a pall of uncertainty over the inauguration of President Biden on
January 20.
On February 10, 2021, nearly a year after the petition for en banc review had been
filed, the Ninth Circuit denied it without a word of explanation.219 It may have
seemed that, after more than five years from the initial filing, the Juliana case had
reached a crossroads that would force the youth to either drop their case or make an
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But the timing of the Ninth Circuit’s denial of en
banc portended another tangible possibility. Having not issued a denial until
President Biden was elected and firmly installed as President,220 the Ninth Circuit
kept the case alive into a new administration, such that it could provide a platform
for settlement with the Biden agencies (which replaced the Trump administration
defendants in the case) in a manner that could create a framework for enduring
climate policy. Due to the COVID pandemic, the U.S. Supreme Court’s normal
deadlines for appeal (through a petition for certiorari) had been extended to July 12,
2021, giving plaintiffs a window of time to consider whether to file for certiorari.
Just hours after the petition denial issued, Our Children’s Trust announced that it
would ask the Biden administration to engage in settlement discussions.221

217. Id. at 1180–81.
218. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
219. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Juliana v. United States (9th Cir.
2021) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA).
220. Commentators have noted the “extraordinary amount of time” that it took for the
Ninth Circuit to deny review with no opinion. Richard Frank, The End of Juliana Litigation–
Or Is It?, LEGALPLANET (Feb. 15, 2021), https://legal-planet.org/2021/02/15/the-end-of-the
-juliana-litigation-or-is-it/ [https://perma.cc/TS4N-W7G3]. We will likely never know
whether this period of languishment was due to circumstances unrelated to the posture of the
case, or whether the judges held the opinion that long to keep the case alive into a new
administration and thereby provide an opportunity for settlement.
221. Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, 9th Circuit Denies En Banc Review for Juliana
v. United States; Youth Plaintiffs Will Take Their Case to Supreme Court (Feb. 10, 2021),
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President Biden entered office with a top priority of confronting climate change
and decarbonizing the energy sector, while at the same time promoting
environmental justice. Whereas President Trump had floored the accelerator on fossil
fuels, President Biden claimed he was intent on slamming on the brakes. On his first
day, he signed an executive order, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad,” declaring: “We have a narrow moment to pursue action at home and abroad
in order to avoid the most catastrophic impacts of that crisis and to seize the
opportunity that tackling climate change presents.”222 The order halted the drilling
and leasing of public lands and offshore waters for fossil fuel development.223 The
Biden policy initiatives, however, would be fleeting if not anchored by an enduring
legal obligation and enforcement framework that could withstand the political
tornados of subsequent elections that could potentially reinstall Trump himself or
another fossil fuel ally as President. Even member nations of the G7 doubted Biden’s
ability to forge climate commitments that would stick amidst the wild pendulum of
American politics.224 The project of decarbonization and drawdown of excess carbon
requires decades and is expected, even in a best-case scenario, to last to the end of
the century. Executive orders, while symbolic and useful to guide internal leadership,
have little force and can easily be unraveled by the next administration (as Biden
demonstrated in his first week in office by reversing many Trump executive orders
and as Trump also demonstrated, reversing many of Obama’s executive orders).225
A settlement wrapped in a consent decree with ongoing court jurisdiction would
allow the Biden administration to architect an enduring framework for the decadeslong project of restoring the climate system. Perhaps, as Judge Aiken remarked to
DOJ attorney Sean Duffy in the Juliana hearing that launched the court’s
engagement so long ago, the government should welcome the court as a co-equal
branch of government putting the pressure on to create solutions.226

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/6024303eba0e5b78c9b
7a2fd/1612984382920/2021.02.10.Juliana+Press+Release.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XQ5TKDFH].
222. Executive Order 14008 of January 27, 2021: Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Feb. 1, 2021).
223. Id. at 7624–25, section 208.
224. See generally Ashley Parker & Anne Gearan, Biden Asks G-7 to Take a Tougher Line
on China, but Not All Allies Are Enthusiastic, WASH. POST (June 12, 2021, 1:54 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/g7-biden-china/2021/06/12/532a0bb2-cb66-11eb
-a11b-6c6191ccd599_story.html [https://perma.cc/9JWZ-T7X2].
225. See Susan Milligan, Two Steps Backward, One Step Forward, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2021-01-29
/biden-spends-first-week-issuing-orders-reversing-trumps-orders; Huma Kahn, In First 100
Days, Obama Flips Bush Admin’s Policies, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2009),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Obama100days/story?id=7042171&page=1
[https://perma.cc/9PRH-S54K].
226. See supra notes 152–155 (citing transcript of oral argument).

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 292

1/24/22 9:05 AM

2022]

CONFRONTING CLIMATE EMERGENCY

281

XIII. JULIANA REVIVED: THE UZUEGBUNAM DECISION AND THE MOTION TO FILE AN
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Just after the Ninth Circuit’s timely denial of en banc review, the U.S. Supreme
Court handed down a case that affirmed plaintiffs’ arguments about the importance
of declaratory relief as a basis for standing. The case involved a student, Chike
Uzuegbunam, at a public college in Georgia who was prevented by university police
from distributing flyers carrying a religious message on campus.227 Arguing that this
policy violated his First Amendment rights, Uzuegbunam sued the school seeking
both nominal damages and an injunction to stop the college from enforcing the
policy.228 While the litigation was pending, the school decided to abandon its
prohibitive policy, ultimately delivering the Supreme Court this question: could a
suit be entertained on the basis of nominal damages alone for an occurrence that had
occurred entirely in the past?229
By a vote of 8-1, the Court held that such a remedy satisfied the redressability
element of Article III standing. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas,
traced the common law practice of awarding nominal damages even when actual
damages were not claimed, noting that such a practice offered plaintiffs who were
otherwise unharmed financially to receive a kind of declaratory judgment.230 In this
way, as the Court noted, “the common law avoided the oddity of privileging smalldollar economic rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary
rights.”231 Ultimately, the Court held that a request for nominal damages satisfies the
redressability element necessary for Article III standing where a plaintiff's claim is
based on a completed violation of a legal right. By characterizing nominal damages
as essentially a proxy for a declaratory judgment, the opinion indicates that a
declaratory judgment alone suffices to support the redressability requirement of
Article III.232 Judge Hurwitz’s skepticism of the declaratory judgment relief
requested by the Juliana plaintiffs seemingly runs counter to this recent U.S.
Supreme Court direction.
Without delay, on March 9, 2021 (the day after the Uzuegbunam opinion was
issued), the attorneys for the Juliana plaintiffs filed a motion with the District Court
of Oregon requesting leave to file an amended complaint.233 Attorneys fashioned the
motion to assert declaratory relief that would fit the mold set by the Uzuegbunam
opinion.234 Specifically, plaintiffs sought a judicial remedy declaring the plaintiffs’

227. Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 794 (2021).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 800.
232. Id. at 798.
233. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC).
234. At the hearing on the motion to amend the complaint, Judge Aiken suggested the
plaintiffs could seek nominal damages as well to align the relief closely with that in the
Uzuegbunam case. See Transcript of June 25, 2021, Oral Argument at 21, Juliana v. United
States (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA), rev’d & remanded, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.
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rights, the defendants’ wrongdoing, and the standard for climate protection. The
motion also asked for further injunctive relief.235 Such modified relief, by eliminating
a request for a remedial plan, would avoid the Ninth Circuit majority’s primary
objection to a court getting entangled with what it considered to be policy decisions.
By keeping the case alive in the District Court of Oregon through a motion for
amended complaint (if granted), the reshaped remedy centering on declaratory relief
could support a trial probing the science and decarbonization/drawdown pathways
consistent with protecting plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. And importantly, the case
could serve as the vehicle for robust settlement negotiations that could end in a courtapproved consent decree. Because consent decrees can provide a broader scope of
relief than that awarded by a court after trial,236 the turn of events brought the case
uncannily close to its longstanding original vision of positioning the court as an
engaged institution overseeing a climate remedy.
XIV. FORGING A PATH TO SETTLEMENT
On May 13, the district court set a hearing date on the plaintiffs’ motion to amend
their complaint and also ordered the parties to engage in settlement discussions prior
to the hearing.237 Judge Aiken recalled Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin (who had
earlier presided as magistrate over the case) from his full retirement to oversee such
negotiations. Judge Aiken emphasized the gravity of the moment and urged the
government defendants to take seriously this opportunity, stating:
[E]veryone should take a look at what this case is about and . . . the best
way to move it forward and how to take advantage of . . . a couple of
branches of government—maybe all three—working together to resolve
disputes . . . . I would hope that you are grateful and are appreciative of
having this opportunity to look globally at how this case may be resolved
[in a manner] that moves forward what we understand [is] a crisis.
So do not—do not see that as just a ministerial step in what you need to
do to make the next legal decision. Take a step back from it and take a
look at what you need to do to move forward on what you all know are
issues in this case that can be resolved [and] that will best address the
rights that have been acknowledged in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.238

2020).
235. See Proposed Second Amended Complaint, supra note 233, at 5 (“If the constitutional
controversy is resolved in their favor by declaratory judgment, Plaintiffs intend to seek further
relief as deemed appropriate and consistent with the separation of powers between the three
branches of government.”).
236. See generally Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir 1983).
237. Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Judge Orders Settlement Conference in
Landmark Youth Climate Case, Juliana v. United States; Schedules Oral Arguments for
June, (May 13, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0
/t/609d98700002ab3ea339fc91/1620940912551/PressRelease051321.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PV3-DCVC].
238. Transcript of May 13, 2021, Telephonic Status Conf. at 9–10, Juliana v. United States,
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Judge Aiken set the date for oral arguments on the motion for amended complaint
out far enough—June 25—to allow the settlement process to commence. On June 8,
2021, attorneys general from seventeen “red” states moved to intervene in the
settlement negotiations.239 On July 7, 2021, attorneys general from “blue” states of
New York, Oregon, Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Vermont field an amicus
brief supporting the plaintiffs in this new phase of the litigation and opposing the
“red” states’ attempted intervention in the case.240
A consent decree in the Juliana case holds enormous potential to steer and
accelerate U.S. climate action. One of the most important aspects of it would be a
specified standard to carry out the declared constitutional right to a “stable climate
system capable of sustaining human life.”241 As noted earlier, the plaintiffs’ scientific
experts emphasize a need to return the atmospheric concentration of CO2 to 350 ppm
by century’s end and to stabilize the planetary heating to one degree Celsius over
pre-industrial temperatures.242 This is significantly more stringent than the Paris
Accord’s goal of two degrees (above pre-industrial levels), and its aspirational goal
of 1.5 ˚C.243 Those goals frame the commitments of European nations yet are deemed
by some of the world’s leading climate scientists as catastrophic, and not even the
IPCC considers them safe.244 Because Juliana remains the chief American case

217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-0517-TC), rev’d & remanded,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
239. Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Attorneys General in 17 ‘Red’ States Seek to
Insert Themselves as Adversaries to Juliana v. United States Plaintiffs, (June 8, 2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/60c009c6e3d1e2124ce3
8d22/1623198150973/Intervention+PR+060821.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ68-GVRA].
240. Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Attorneys General in New York & Five Other
States File Brief in Support of Juliana v. United States While Plaintiffs Oppose Attempt By
Republican Coalition to Intervene (July 7, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571d109b04426270152febe0/t/60e5d1d17bdcaa4dc6adcd35/1625674193606/Response+to+I
ntervention+PR+070721.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMW6-2ZHN].
241. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
242. See supra note 33. For a summary of temperature impacts and the imperative of
capping Earth’s heating at one degree Celsius over the long term, see OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
GOVERNMENT CLIMATE AND ENERGY ACTIONS, PLANS, AND POLICIES MUST BE BASED ON A
MAXIMUM TARGET OF 350 PPM ATMOSPHERIC CO2 AND 1°C BY 2100 TO PROTECT YOUNG
PEOPLE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5cbf9b1a8165f50477f3d191/1556060958104/2019.04.11
.OCTWhy350.Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K593-GV6T]. For discussion of a special IPCC
report on the consequences of heating 1.5 ˚C., see Brad Plumer & Iris Gottlieb, Why Half a
Degree of Global Warming is a Big Deal, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-report-half-degree.html
[https://perma.cc/DDZ8-SCQY].
243. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 2, § 1(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
244. See Hood, supra note 3 (summarizing IPCC June 2021 draft report as warning that
“prolonged warming even beyond 1.5 degrees Celsius could produce ‘progressively serious,
centuries’ long and, in some cases, irreversible consequences’” and that 2 °C warming could
trigger tipping points including “the melting of ice sheets atop Greenland and the West
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mounting a systemic challenge to the entire U.S. fossil fuel system and draws upon
top climate scientists as experts, this case is singularly positioned to lead nations of
the world in converging on a scientifically credible standard to bring the planet back
to a safe temperature zone by the end of the century. A consent decree becomes the
vehicle for forging agreement between government scientists and the plaintiffs’
experts—and it can display consensus and urgency to the world.
Second, a consent decree can set forth a procedural framework for accomplishing
the decarbonization and drawdown goals necessary to avert runaway heating. This
process does not usurp the regulatory functions of the executive branch but rather
can create a broad scaffolding that will guide and hold agencies accountable in their
innumerable undertakings. The framework is vital to keep planetary rescue on task
and moving forward at a pace that has a chance of beating the climate tipping points.
It should incorporate standards, benchmarks, and timetables to move the project
along with “all deliberate speed.”245 As most consent decrees do, this framework
should include compliance procedures, enforcement mechanisms, and conflict
resolution processes.
Due to the highly technical nature of climate recovery, the process may benefit
from a structure similar to that used by the District Court of Oregon in the Columbia
River Fish Management Plan (CRFMP).246 This Plan—executed among three states,
the federal government, and five treaty tribes overseeing fish management in the
Columbia River Basin—was forged to provide a framework within which the parties
may exercise their sovereign powers in a coordinated and systematic manner to
rebuild fisheries and manage harvests of salmon.247 It features a scientific advisor to
the court, a technical committee, a separate policy committee, a regulatory
coordination committee, and strategic work groups to tackle some of the more
wicked problems that require intense focus and vision. It contains dispute resolution
provisions and envisions a role for the court as a supervising check on the parties
(particularly in the case of a dispute among them or in the event of an emergency)
but does not position the court as a leader of the effort. The process of establishing a
consent decree in the Juliana case could not only greatly accelerate and organize the
U.S. climate effort but could also provide a model for other ATL cases around the
world, leading them back toward a 350 ppm safety goal.
But, despite the obvious benefit to the Biden administration of formulating
(through settlement negotiations) a consent decree that could solidify aspects of its
climate policy, an obstructive logjam seemed evident on the defendants’ side. The
case was still being handled by the same attorney who defended the Obama and
Trump administrations—an attorney who took a defensive, rather than problem-

Antarctic—with enough frozen water to lift oceans 13 metres (43 feet)—past a point of no
return.”).
245. See Transcript of Sept. 13, 2016, Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 59 (remarks of J.
Aiken).
246. WASH. DEP’T FISHERIES, COLUMBIA RIVER FISH MGMT. PLAN (1987), available at
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll3/id/420/[https://perma.cc/X7J
A-DVTR].
247. For a detailed analysis of the CRFMP, see Wood, supra note 124, at 427–37.
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solving, posture.248 In settlement negotiations, representatives of the client agencies,
not the DOJ attorneys, must make the calls as to measures that the government may
or may not agree to. Of all the defendant agencies, the Council of Environmental
Quality (CEQ) may be best positioned to take the lead in organizing the other
defendant agencies in a settlement structure, as CEQ is charged with formulating
national environmental policy.249 The other agency with unique responsibility in the
negotiations is the Department of Interior due to its independent trust obligation to
the native nations, an obligation that is not institutionally captured by the CEQ. But,
even after five months of settlement opportunity, there was no indication of agency
involvement; on November 1, 2021, plaintiffs’ lawyers announced that settlement
negotiations had failed due to the Biden administration’s unwillingness to engage.250
The apparent impasse may provide a basis for the court to probe DOJ attorneys’
ethical obligations to involve client agencies.251

248. See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text (describing tactics of DOJ
attorneys).
249. “The [White House] Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) within the Executive
Office of the President coordinates the federal government’s efforts to improve, preserve, and
protect America’s public health and environment.” Council on Environmental Quality, The
White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/ [https://perma.cc/9ZA5-VJNV].
250.
Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Settlement Talks End Without Resolution in
Juliana v. U.S. Climate Case; Youth Plaintiffs Await Ruling from Federal District Court (Nov.
1, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/
6181ba9912336b4fc5c01345/1635891865535/2021.11.01.Juliana+v+US+Settlement+Ends.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EXH6-TXDH] (“despite good faith efforts on the part of the youth
plaintiffs, they see no reason to continue to pursue settlement discussions until the decisionmakers for the federal defendants come to the settlement table”). On Nov. 18, 2021, members
of the U.S. Senate and members of the U.S. House of Representatives issued separate letters
to President Biden highlighting the importance of the Juliana case and noting Judge Aiken’s
order to the parties to engage in settlement negotiations. Both letters highlighted Judge Aiken’s
statements underscoring the need for a “‘Government-wide approach’” to address climate
crisis. Letter from Sen. Jeffrey A. Merkley (and 8 other U.S. Senators) to President Joseph R.
Biden, Nov. 18, 2021, https://www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
21.11.18%20Climate%20Youth%20Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/P53E-6M9P]; Letter from
Rep. Mondaire Jones (and 38 other members of the U.S. House of Representatives) to
President Joseph R. Biden, Nov. 18, 2021, https://jones.house.gov/sites/evosubsites/jones.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/Juliana%20Letter%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NPJ7-4XHB]. Also on Nov. 18, 2021, Bill McKibben and Jerome Foster II
submitted a letter on behalf of 167 national organizations to Attorney General Merrick Garland
expressing “dismay with the DOJ’s position and tactics in the Juliana litigation” and urging
DOJ to “stop fighting the youth and bring to the settlement table tangible ideas” for climate
recovery. Organizational Letter to the DOJ Supporting Juliana v. United States (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://docs.google.com/document/d/12UAHGcNQzNrV5iPmPNHhYikW95RVZahRN5T1e
6lTTNo/edit [https://perma.cc/6XMD-HHML]; see also Bill McKibben, We Need the
“Whole-of-Government” Climate Fight that Biden Promised, NEW YORKER (July 14, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-a-warming-planet/we-need-the-whole-of
government-climate-fight-that-biden-promised [https://perma.cc/H36N-25RE] (urging DOJ
to enter into settlement negotiations and bring a full executive branch strategy to the table).
251. A combination of ethical rules indicates that lawyers have the duty to consult with
their clients on settlement scenarios. See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.2(a) (adopted by
all states) (“Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the

362013-ILJ 97-1_Text.indd 297

1/24/22 9:05 AM

286

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:239

XV. GREEN JUDICIAL DOMINOS: ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LITIGATION AROUND THE
WORLD
The original vision of the ATL approach contemplated that, because the
atmosphere is a shared planetary trust resource, the strategy would take hold in
nations worldwide to create domestic judicial enforcement structures for climate
obligations that eluded international processes.252 Treaty negotiations such as the
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Accord gravitate to the lowest common
denominator of political consensus (which, in the climate context, remains far astray
from Nature’s own imperatives for a balanced climate system).253 Moreover,
international commitments are not self-enforcing and are all too often repudiated by
domestic decisions of agencies and legislatures.254 For example, President Donald
Trump withdrew the United States entirely from the Paris Climate Accord that
President Barack Obama had previously agreed to. While international law
mechanisms remain unenforceable, Professors Jim May and Erin Daly observe that
cases advancing constitutional theories of climate obligation are swiftly gaining
ground in the world’s domestic courts, and are “likely reflective of an emerging
worldwide phase in constitutional litigation.” 255
Inspired by the twenty-one youth plaintiffs in Juliana, citizens in many other
countries have taken their governments to court to enforce a fundamental right to a
stable climate system.256 These cases draw upon various legal grounds specific to the

client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.” (emphases added)); see also id. r.
1.4(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these
Rules . . . .”); id. r. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”). The totality of
these rules indicates the lawyer’s ethical obligation to communicate with clients on settlement
potential so that the client may make an informed decision.
252. See generally Wood, 2009 ATL chapter, supra note 94, at 95; see also William S.
Becker, Giving Legal Teeth to Climate Change, COMMENTARY BY WILLIAM BECKER (June 8,
2021), https://the-real-biocene.net/f/giving-legal-teeth-to-climate-action [https://perma.cc/
PF3A-54GT] (referring to original ATL concept).
253. See Booth & Pager, supra note 51 (current climate pledges by nations would result in
a 2.7˚C catastrophic heating).
254. See James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Climate Constitutionalism and Justice in the
Courts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 235, 235–45
(Jordi Jaria-Manzano & Susana Borràs eds., 2019).
255. Id. at 235.
256. See Richard Frank, The End of the Juliana Litigation—Or Is It?, LEGALPLANET (Feb.
15,
2021),
https://legal-planet.org/2021/02/15/the-end-of-the-juliana-litigation-or-is-it/
[https://perma.cc/J75J-TATB]; see also Bobby Magill, Another Youth Climate Lawsuit Turns
to Crowdfunding in Portugal, THE CLIMATE DOCKET (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.climatedocket.com/2017/09/27/youth-climate-lawsuit-portugal-wildfires/
[https://perma.cc/YKY6-W28U] (noting that the Portuguese litigation was inspired by the
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particular nation, often including express constitutional rights. Ultimately, all of the
claims of right to a sustained environment for future generations emanate from a core
legal trunk that is the public trust. Mentioned explicitly or not, a sovereign duty to
present and future citizens to protect vital ecology traces back most anciently and
essentially to Roman law safeguarding crucial resources in common for posterity.
Thus, broadly defined, atmospheric trust cases involve these common elements: (1)
citizen plaintiffs (often youth), (2) suing their government, (3) alleging violation of
fundamental rights to protect the climate system for present and future generations,
and (4) seeking relief that forces expedient climate action on the part of government.
While Ninth Circuit Judges Hurwitz and Murguia rejected a judicial role of
enforcing fundamental rights in the climate context, a growing number of courts in
ATL cases from other nations are delivering victories to plaintiffs. Recognizing that
government actions perpetuating fossil fuel energy systems deliver an existential
threat to our climate system, they decide the courts must step in. While this Article
does not provide a comprehensive discussion of decisions from other nations, a brief
inventory shows the beginning of what may soon accelerate into a global ATL
jurisprudence.
In Pakistan’s case, Leghari v. State, a farmer alleged that climate inaction (both
with respect to emissions reduction and adaptation) violated his fundamental
constitutional rights to life, dignity, and the public trust doctrine.257 The Lahore High
Court agreed, finding such fundamental rights (including the public trust doctrine)
violated by the “delay and lethargy” of the government agencies.258 The court
fashioned a classic structural injunction remedy to correct the government’s
recalcitrance. The court created an administrative judicial apparatus to supervise a
climate response, ordering the establishment of a Climate Change Commission
(CCC) comprised of high cabinet officials.259 Directing the commission to carry out
the climate measures forged through a framework previously formulated by the
government but never implemented, the court’s order contemplated ongoing reports
and judicial supervision.260 The effort was so successful that, in 2018, the court
dissolved the CCC and established a Standing Committee to provide an ongoing
bridge between the court and the Executive Branch and to support the latter in
implementing the climate goals.261
In the Netherlands, in Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands, the Hague
Court of Appeal, and later the nation’s Supreme Court, affirmed a lower court’s
finding that the Dutch government failed to address climate change with the speed

Juliana case).
257. Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore High Ct. Green
Bench) *1–2, *4 (Pak.), translation available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-changelitigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/20150404_2015
-W.P.-No.-25501201_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWA-P2XC].
258. Id. at *3, ¶¶ 7–8.
259. Id. at *6–7.
260. Id. This case is discussed in detail in Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights
Turn in Climate Change Litigation?, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 37, 48–49, 52–55 (2018).
261. James R. May & Erin Daly, Six Trends in Global Environmental Constitutionalism,
in ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: WHAT IMPACT ON LEGAL SYSTEMS? 46, 52 (Jochen
Sohnle ed., 2018).
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and scope required to protect current and future generations of its citizens.262 The
trial court flatly rejected the government’s claim that judicial intervention was an
unwarranted intrusion on the political branches of government.263 Noting that the
risks associated with climate change are severe and that the state’s obligations to its
people require immediate and strenuous action to achieve significant reductions in
carbon emissions, the trial court concluded that the state was obligated to reduce
emissions by a minimum of twenty-five percent by 2020 relative to 1990 emissions
levels.264 The Urgenda decision successfully pushed the government to issue a broad
emissions reduction regulation in April 2020.265
In Colombia, in 2018, that nation’s supreme court found in favor of plaintiffs in a
case, Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment, brought by twenty-five
youth between the ages of seven and twenty-six to end deforestation of the Amazon
that was contributing to climate disruption.266 The court declared a fundamental right
held by youth and future generations to protection of the Amazon due to its
significant role in the planet’s climate regulation,267 writing, “[W]hile sea level rise
and ocean acidification derived from deforestation-induced regional and global

262. Rb. Den Haag June 24, 2015, ¶ 5.1 ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (State of the
Neth./Urgenda Found.) (The Hague District Court’s [trial court’s] decision), translation
available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites
/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/20150624_2015-HAZA-C0900456689_decision-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PFG3-EJSF]. Hof Den Haag Oct. 9, 2018, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610
(State of the Neth./Urgenda Found.) (Hague Court of Appeals’ decision), translation available
at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-uscase-documents/2018/20181009_2015-HAZA-C0900456689_decision-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VMU-SNR2]; HR Dec. 12, 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007 (Supreme
Court
of
the
Netherlands’
decision),
translation
available
at
http://
climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case
-documents/2020/20200113_2015-HAZA-C0900456689_judgment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JMM8-DDT8]. The Urgenda Foundation filed the suit as a citizens’
organization, whose purpose is to develop measures to prevent climate change, and on behalf
of 900 Dutch citizens. The rulings and a summary of the case are compiled by the Sabin Center
at Columbia University. See The Sabin Center’s Climate Case Chart, CLIMATE CASE CHART,
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/non-us-case/urgenda-foundation-vkingdom-of-the-netherlands/ [https://perma.cc/PD67-RKEV]. For discussion of this litigation,
see State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2090 (2019).
263. Rb. Den Haag June 24, 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196, ¶¶ 4.94–4.98 (“It is an
essential feature of the rule of law that the actions of (independent, democratic, legitimised[,]
and controlled) political bodies, such as the government and parliament can[—]and sometimes
must[—]be assessed by an independent court.”).
264. Id. at ¶ 5.1.
265. Jonathan Watts, Dutch Officials Reveal Measures to Cut Emissions After Court
Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2020, 12:10 PM), www.theguardian.com/world/2020
/apr/24/dutch-officials-reveal-measures-to-cut-emissions-after-court-ruling
[https://perma.cc/MU8U-QZ23].
266. Samvel Varvastian, The Human Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment in Climate
Change Litigation, in MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 11 (Max Planck Inst., Ser. No. 2019-09,
2019); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Casacion Civil. April 4,
2018, M.P: L. Villabona, Expediente STC4360-2018.
267. See May & Daly, supra note 261, at 9–10 (SSRN version).
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warming conflicts with the fundamental rights and interests of the present generation,
it will impact and thus violate the rights of future generations more severely still.”268
But lacking a remedy structure to implement the ruling, the court’s order has been
roundly ignored by the Colombian government.269
In France, in February 2021, a Paris administrative court delivered a victory to
citizens of the coastal community Grande-Synthe in their suit filed against the French
State for failing to adequately address climate change. The Court of Paris found the
French State guilty of failing to meet its own goals as set forth in the Paris Agreement
and ordered the state to
fulfill its general and specific obligations in the fight against climate
change or to mitigate its effects, to put an end to the ecological damage,
and in particular, within the shortest possible time, to . . . take the
necessary measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . . . to a level
consistent with the objective of containing the rise in global average
temperature below 1.5°C.270
The court also ordered the state to pay a symbolic sum of one euro to each plaintiff
for “the ecological damage” and “moral prejudice” resulting from the state’s failure
to meet its targets.271 Reflecting elements of a structural injunction, the court
enjoined the French state from worsening the ecological damage while the court and
“all competent ministers to all the parties” would formulate, within two months’
time, further measures to rectify the situation.272
In Ireland, a 2020 Supreme Court decision in Friends of the Irish Environment
CLG v. Ireland, also reflects judicial willingness to review state climate action
plans.273 The plaintiff organization asserted that the government’s plan to cut carbon
emissions was insufficient and a violation of the fundamental right to life as
guaranteed in the nation’s Constitution and the European Convention on Human
Rights. While concluding that the plaintiff, as a corporate entity, lacked standing with
respect to questions implicating a right to life or bodily integrity, the court decided
that the plaintiff’s assertions concerning the climate plan were valid and justiciable—
and, importantly, emphasized that the court’s ruling did not constitute an

268. Climate Change and Future Generations Lawsuit in Colombia: Key Excerpts from
the Supreme Court’s Decision, DEJUSTICIA (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.dejusticia.org/en
/climate-change-and-future-generations-lawsuit-in-colombia-key-excerpts-from-the-supreme
-courts-decision/ [https://perma.cc/W893-XX3Z].
269. The Colombian Government Has Failed to Fulfill the Supreme Court’s Landmark
Order to Protect the Amazon, DEJUSTICIA (April 5, 2019), https://www.dejusticia.org/en/thecolombian-government-has-failed-to-fulfill-the-supreme-courts-landmark-order-to-protectthe-amazon/ [https://perma.cc/KR3L-X8ZX].
270. [Admin. Ct.] Paris, 1st Chamber, Feb. 3, 2021, N°1904967, 1904968, 1904972,
1904976/4-1, art. IV § 3.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Friends of the Irish Env’t CLG v. Gov’t of Ireland [2020] Appeal No. 205/19 (Sup.
Ct. of Ir.), available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20200731_2017-No.-793JR_opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYZ8-QJPW].
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“impermissible impingement by the courts into areas of policy.”274 The court
overturned the climate plan, which it found insufficiently comprehensive and too
vague to carry out the goals of national climate legislation, and it ordered the
government to develop a more ambitious policy.275
In Germany, April 2021, in a case brought on behalf of nine young people against
the German Government challenging the federal climate law as too weak, the Federal
Constitutional Court overturned the government’s climate plan on the basis that it
infringed the rights of future generations.276 The plan had called for elimination of
GHG emissions by midcentury but failed to set emissions targets beyond 2030.
Finding that the government had “offloaded” the burden of emissions reduction on
future generations, the court wrote that young people would be “‘forced to engage in
radical abstinence’ to preserve the ‘natural foundations of life.’”277 As the lead
attorney for the German plaintiffs said, the lawsuit succeeded in gaining judicial
recognition “for the first time that freedom must be guaranteed not only here and
now, but also intertemporally and globally—that is, across generations and across
state borders.”278 In a directive characteristic of a structural injunction with clearly
timed benchmarks, the court ordered the German government to set binding emission
targets by 2022 (within a year) to allocate emissions reduction beyond 2030.279
Shortly after the ruling, the German government responded with a new draft law
increasing the emissions reduction target for the end the decade (from fifty-five
percent to sixty-five percent below 1990 levels) and advancing (by five years) the
net-zero target date.280
In May of 2021, the Federal Court of Australia ruled on a class action brought by
youth challenging Australian coal extraction. In Sharma v. Minister for the
Environment,281 the court ruled that the government holds a legal duty of care to not

274. Id. § 9.1.
275. Id. § 9.3. See also Isabella Kaminski, Ireland Forced to Strengthen Climate Plan, in
Supreme Court Win for Campaigners, CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS (July 31, 2020),
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/07/31/ireland-forced-strengthen-climate-plansupreme-court-victory-campaigners/ [https://perma.cc/5LQW-RZ3J].
276. Eric Heymann, Climate Change Ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court:
Calling for Technological Progress, DEUTSCHE BANK (May 11, 2021),
https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB;REWEBJSESSIONID=8D2A01287B6
685237337780B2C0C9A4D?rwsite=RPS_ENPROD&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&docum
ent=PROD0000000000518283
[https://perma.cc/F5YS-XBZK];
Press
Release,
Germanwatch, Historic Win for Climate Constitutional Complaint (Apr. 29, 2021),
https://germanwatch.org/en/node/20134 [https://perma.cc/QH2B-WHRJ].
277. Press Release, Constitutional Complaints Against the Federal Climate Change Act
Partially Successful (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/bvg21-031.html [https://perma.cc/MXN7-MJDL].
278. Evan Dyer, Young Climate Activists Beat Germany's Government in Court. Could it
Happen Here?, CBC NEWS (May 23, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics
/climate-change-emissions-carbon-canada-germany-youth-1.6029642
[https://perma.cc/8SU8-AR8L].
279. Becker, supra note 252.
280. Dyer, supra note 278.
281. Sharma v Minister for the Environment [2021] FCA 560 1, 113–15 (Austl.), available
at
https://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2021/
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cause climate harm to the young people of Australia through approval of coal
extraction.282 While declining to enjoin coal extraction at that time, the judge
emphasized that the government must take into account this duty in deciding whether
to allow the challenged coal mine.283 The decision builds on a prior notable decision
from Australia in 2019 in which a court enjoined a coal mine partly on the basis of
likely harm to present and future generations.284
Other ATL cases brought by citizens against their governments are proceeding
apace in India,285 Mexico, South Korea, Czech Republic, Canada, Norway, Uganda,
Brazil, and Belgium.286 As judges around the world rise to the climate emergency
and hold their governments accountable, it is increasingly clear that the Juliana Ninth
Circuit majority’s hands-off approach is becoming more and more of an outlier. It
will be important for ATL judges in all of these nations to recognize their shared role
in planetary rescue by: (1) arriving at a globally coherent scientific standard of

2021fca0560 [https://perma.cc/9AAC-VSNL].
282. See Michael Slezak & Penny Timms, Australian Teenagers’ Climate Change Class
Action Case Opens ‘Big Crack in the Wall,’ Expert Says, ABC NEWS (May 26, 2021),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-27/climate-class-action-teenagers-vickery-coal-minelegal-precedent/100169398 [https://perma.cc/J9JY-MQD8].
283. Sharma, FCA 560 at 116 (“[The minister] will now appreciate, contrary to the
submissions made on her behalf at trial, that in deciding whether or not to approve the
Extension Project she must take into account, as a mandatory relevant consideration, the
avoidance of personal injury to people.”); see also Slezak & Timms, supra 282.
284. See Gloucester Res. Ltd. v Minister for Planning (Unreported, Land and Environment
Court of New South Wales, Preston CJ, 8 Feb. 2019) ¶ 669; see also Karen Savage, Australian
Judge Rejects Coal Mine on Climate Grounds, THE CLIMATE DOCKET (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.climatedocket.com/2019/02/08/australia-coal-mine-climate/
[https://perma.cc/LCS9-TRVD].
285. Press Release, Our Children’s Trust, Youth Files Climate Case with India’s
Environmental Court (Mar. 30, 2017), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b0442
6270152febe0/t/58dd798a1e5b6c41e0da4cc0/1490909578851/2017.03.30+India+Climate+
Case+PR.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9DT-ZAL3].
CHILDREN’S
TRUST,
286. See
Other
Global
Actions,
OUR
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/other-global-actions; see also Active Global Cases, OUR
CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/active-global-cases [https://perma.cc/
38AL-ETV9]. For discussion of the Canada lawsuit, see Dyer, supra note 278. The Czech case
is compiled in the Sabin Center’s CLIMATE CASE CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/climatechange-litigation/non-us-case/klimaticka-zaloba-cr-v-czech-republic/
[https://perma.cc/QR3N-V9LS] and is described in Ines Ribas, Activists File Climate Lawsuit
Against the Czech Government, BRNO DAILY (APRIL 23, 2021), https://brnodaily.com/
2021/04/23/news/politics/activists-file-climate-lawsuit-against-the-czech-government/
[https://perma.cc/YS7E-4KX3]. See also Dana Drugmand, Latest Youth Climate Lawsuit
Filed Against 33 European Countries Over Human Rights, DESMOG (SEPT. 30, 2020),
https://www.desmog.com/2020/09/03/youth-climate-lawsuit-portugal-33-europeancountries/ [https://perma.cc/MX38-LEQ4] (reporting climate suit by Portuguese children
against governments of thirty-three European nations in the European Court of Human
Rights). For an article on Brazil ATL, see Joana Setzer & Délton Winter de Carvalho, Climate
Litigation to Protect the Brazilian Amazon: Establishing a Constitutional Right to a Stable
Climate, RECIEL (July 28, 2021), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/full/10.1111/reel.12409 [https://perma.cc/8KYQ-RWDG].
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climate recovery tied to safe levels of atmospheric CO2; (2) quantifying emission
reduction obligations; and (3) creating practical enforcement mechanisms. The
collaborative and synergistic potential of functionally intertwined climate court
decisions is perhaps unprecedented in global legal history. The International Court
of Justice (ICJ), a judicial arm of the U.N., stands positioned to play a cardinal role
in defining, through an advisory opinion, the climate fiduciary duties of all nations—
nations which stand as co-tenant sovereign trustees of the planetary atmospheric
trust.287
Judge Aiken’s pathbreaking opinion, declaring a right to a “climate system
capable of sustaining human life” forms the basis of ATL decisions worldwide.288
The combination of (1) scientific evidence in the voluminous Juliana docket
showing the need to return the atmospheric CO2 to below 350 ppm, (2) the evidence
in the case showing decarbonization and drawdown pathways, and (3) the established
judicial framework of consent decrees long ago forged by the District Court of
Oregon in the Columbia River Treaty fishing context, all have much to contribute—
by reference and example—to the emerging global climate jurisprudence. Just as
clearly, the unvarnished message of moral responsibility emanating from so many
courts of other nations must stir the American appellate judiciary to hold its own
government accountable.
CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PLANETARY RESCUE
Ending her momentous dissent in Juliana, Judge Staton asked a question that
forces judges in the United States, and across the world, to reckon with their
sovereign role as well as their own personal responsibility—as judges empowered at
this singularly fateful moment. She wrote, “[H]istory will not judge us kindly. When
the seas envelop our coastal cities, fires and droughts haunt our interiors, and storms
ravage everything between, those remaining will ask: Why did so many do so
little?”289

287. See Michael B. Gerrard, Taking Climate Change to the International Court of Justice:
Legal and Procedural Issues, COLUM. CLIMATE L. BLOG (Sept. 29, 2021), http://blogs.law
.columbia.edu/climatechange/2021/09/29/taking-climate-change-to-the-international-court
-of-justice-legal-and-procedural-issues/ [https://perma.cc/GHE4-74N3]. The article explains
the ICJ process of rendering advisory opinions and notes:
An increasing number of domestic courts around the world are considering the
issue of climate change and citing to international agreements and to the
decisions of the courts of other countries. An ICJ opinion, if it got to the merits,
would surely become the leading authority to which these domestic courts
would look in framing their own decisions.
With the aim of framing a global ATL jurisprudence emerging from domestic courts worldwide, a sequel to this Article is underway to propose the elements of such an advisory opinion
and to inventory tools used by courts to enforce domestic climate obligations.
288. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d & remanded,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
289. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1191 (Staton, J., dissenting).
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This Article has suggested that courts bring an essential and obligatory
constitutional role to the climate emergency. The judicial branch remains uniquely
constituted to respond to this urgent and grave situation by holding government
actors accountable. Courts can declare rights, enforce sidewalls, and issue backstop
injunctions to stop government agencies and their allied fossil fuel industries from
pushing the planet over the climate threshold of no return. Courts can further provide
a problem-solving mechanism for climate recovery through a rigorous, fact-based
remedial process that imposes strict timeframes for action. Indeed, there is no
equivalent process in the other branches. As Justice Martha Walters wrote in her
dissenting opinion in the Oregon ATL case: “This court can and should determine
the law that governs the other two branches as they undertake their essential work.”290
But as the climate crisis worsens, judges face a crossroads. One approach is flatout denial of any conceivable role—what Professor Douglas Kysar of Yale Law
School and R. Henry Weaver term judicial nihilism.291 This mindset characterizes
the majority’s opinion in Juliana (as well as many state ATL rulings in America)
wherein the judges, powerfully vested with authority to act, instead “cowe[r] before
catastrophe.”292 Such judges willingly remain stuck in the old paradigm of judicial
review. The other approach is typified by the opinions of Judge Aiken and Judge
Staton, wherein the judiciary acts as a coequal branch of government, enforcing
fundamental rights of citizens, and providing a forum for institutional problemsolving through the use of traditional and established legal methods.
As Judge Coffin—the magistrate judge who first heard the Juliana case and
presently presides over settlement discussions––wrote,
Do the Courts have a role in providing a forum for litigation wherein
those injured by climate change may seek relief against parties allegedly
causing or contributing to this phenomenon? My answer is: How could
they not? These are the civil rights cases of the 21st Century. Civil rights
cases have historically invoked the authority of all three branches of
government, with each having an important and vital part in promoting
and protecting the rights and liberties of the people. . . . In the end, a trial
in the public forum of a court is an extremely important tool of
Democracy.293
When Judge Belloni concluded the arduous multi-sovereign settlement process
leading to his approval of the Columbia River Fish Management Plan in 1977, he
remarked on the significance of the agreement and the magnitude of the judicial role:
The extreme importance of this settlement and this consent decree is
difficult to express. Every person in the Northwest gains by it. It’s the
most important development involving Columbia River Indian Treaty

290. Chernaik v. Brown, 475 P.3d 68, 84 (Or. 2020).
291. See R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar, Courting Disaster: Climate Change and
the Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 295, 329 (2017).
292. Id.
293. Thomas M. Coffin, American Courts in Climate Emergency, IUCN (2019),
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/2019/american_courts_in_climate
_emergency.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G7F-86MY].
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Fishing Rights and Responsibilities since the treaties became effective in
1855. The settlement will have a meritorious effect not only upon Indian
and non-Indian fishermen, but on many of our other major industries . . . .
The past few years have been traumatic ones. Fishermen have been
disappointed and angry, justifiably so. The economic loss has hurt badly.
The responsible state officials must have . . . felt frustrated many times.
It has been equally traumatic to me. Yet I have had to be firm and apply
the law as it is. It was my Constitutional duty. Had I yielded to the strong
temptation to bend a little to relieve some of the pressure, this agreement
would never have been reached, and the trauma would have continued.
Not only was the integrity of the law at stake, but so was the very survival
of the salmon resource in the Columbia River.294
Much has changed since a half century ago when this Oregon district court judge
forged a multi-sovereign agreement to save the salmon that had made their way up
the Columbia River to their natal waters since time immemorial. Today, the U.S.
District Court of Oregon has the climate system on its docket, and the survival of the
world’s children and future generations hinges in large part on whether the American
government will be held accountable for climate recovery. Judge Aiken recently
urged the parties in Juliana v. United States to recognize that the court may serve as
“the galvanizer or the convener” of the multiple agency defendants and plaintiffs in
a solution-driven process that falls wholly in line with the path forged by Judge
Belloni decades ago.
Certainly courts do not provide a panacea for this crisis, and, had the government
functioned as intended, the courts would not be involved today. But now courts hold
the crucial last legal lever to force the government defendants to focus with all
deliberate speed on this urgent matter, operate in concert with each other outside of
agency silos, consult with scientific experts, and accomplish what they should have
all along: construct and carry out a climate protection strategy that secures the
fundamental rights of young Americans to life, liberty, and property.
Inevitably, those who defend a suicidal Business As Usual approach will roundly
criticize any role the courts may play. To them, the matter must be left entirely to the
political branches—those that delivered us all this existential threat in the first
place.295 This Article has argued that a failure of checks and balances in the three
branches of government was the root cause of government’s catastrophic energy
policy, and, at this eleventh hour, the courts must step in to avert runaway planetary
heating before Nature’s own laws render the legal issues entirely moot by
overwhelming the world with climate mayhem.

294. Transcript of Feb. 28, 1977 Hearing at 4–6, U.S. v. Oregon, Civil 68-513 (D. Or.
Feb. 28, 1977) (No. 295), (emphasis added). See generally Order Approving the 1977 Plan,
U.S. v. Oregon, Civil 68-513 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 1977) (No. 294) (unpublished motion on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
295. See James L. Huffman, Is a Federal Judge Trying to Set Climate Policy with the
‘Juliana’ Case? THE HILL (July 1, 2021, 10:30 AM) https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary
/560941-is-a-federal-judge-trying-to-set-climate-policy-with-the-juliana-case
[https://perma.cc/LF36-SGS7].
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One thing is clear. Against an unspeakably cruel prospect of massive global death
and misery underwritten by world leaders in their continued promotion of fossil
fuels, judges of any nation may no longer avoid choosing their side of history—for
judicial passivity is as much a clear choice as judicial intervention. As Dr. James
Hansen, formerly the nation’s chief climate scientist at NASA, has warned,
“[F]ailure to act with all deliberate speed . . . functionally becomes a decision to
eliminate the option of preserving a habitable climate system.”296
If, in ten years, the planet is well on the path to climate recovery, it may be because
the judges of this world realized that their time to act is right now.

296. Blumm & Wood, supra note 4, at 6 (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for Dr.
James Hansen as Amicus Curiae at 7, Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012)
(No. 4:11-cv-02203 EMC), ECF No. 108).
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